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BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION: MISSISSIPPI'S CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM SUCCESS AND A PATH FORWARD
Mark A. Behrens* & Cary Silverman**
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, in the wake of Mississippi's adoption of meaningful civil
justice reforms, we declared in this Law Review that the state's legal cli-
mate had been transformed and that Mississippi was "open for business."'
Before that time, Mississippi was known as the "lawsuit capital of the
world."' Our article documented the improvements in Mississippi's busi-
ness and healthcare environment as a result of civil justice reform legisla-
tion and Mississippi Supreme Court action.
This article revisits the reforms that turned the tide and explores their
effect over the past decade. Today, Mississippi doctors pay malpractice in-
surance premiums that are, on average, one-third of the amount they paid
in 2004-helping the state attract more physicians and improving access to
care. Businesses that might have closed shop have instead expanded their
operations in Mississippi. Mississippi courts are now focused on deciding
the claims of Mississippians with potentially meritorious cases instead of
spending resources on lawsuits brought by people with no connection to
the state. Outlier awards have become less common. Defendants pay their
"fair share" of awards, but no longer have to pay for the fault of others.
But Mississippi cannot simply rest on achievements that occurred over
a decade ago. As we said in our earlier article, "gains can become ground
lost if these efforts stop."4 Mississippi has undertaken little civil justice re-
form since 2004. In the meantime, regional competitors, such as Tennessee,
and other states that compete with Mississippi to attract jobs have enacted
civil justice reforms too, and in some cases have gone further than Missis-
sippi. In addition, some goals of Mississippi's earlier reforms have not
been fully realized, and new issues have arisen that need to be addressed.
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1. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation of Missis-
sippi's Legal Climate, 24 Miss. C. L. REV. 393 (2005).
2. Id. at 393.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 422.
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This article explores three areas for future action: facilitating representa-
tive juries, addressing asbestos and silica litigation abuses, and eliminating
"phantom damages." The article then highlights some additional reforms
that would help ensure that Mississippi remains competitive moving
forward.
The article concludes that civil justice reform in Mississippi has been a
success. As we observed earlier, Mississippi went "from being the poster
child of litigation abuse to a shining example of how a state can join the
legal mainstream and foster economic growth through legal reform."5 But
more is needed to take care of unfinished business from the last round of
civil justice reforms and address changing circumstances.
II. ADDRESSING FORUM SHOPPING AND JACKPOT JUSTICE
Mississippi's comprehensive 2002 and 2004 civil justice reforms im-
proved many aspects of the state's civil justice system. Here, we revisit
how the Legislature addressed Mississippi's reputation as a litigation mag-
net known for "jackpot justice."6 The Mississippi Supreme Court also
played a significant role in the transformation of the state's legal climate,
overturning outlier awards, safeguarding a defendant's ability to appeal an
adverse verdict, reining in prejudicial multi-plaintiffs trials, and strengthen-
ing expert testimony standards.'
A. Lawsuits Must Have a Connection to Mississippi
Legislative reform significantly limited the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers
to forum shop in Mississippi. Prior to reform, plaintiffs' lawyers could file a
lawsuit in any county in which any defendant "may be found," the cause of
action accrued or, in the case of a business incorporated in Mississippi,
where the business was domiciled.8 Mississippi's permissive venue law al-
lowed plaintiffs' lawyers to bring their lawsuits in areas with a history of
returning large awards. Often, the forum of choice was the Twenty-second
Judicial District, serving counties then labeled by the American Tort Re-
form Foundation as Judicial Hellholes (Copiah, Claiborne, and Jefferson
5. Id. at 395; see also Stephen Moore, Mississippi's Tort Reform Triumph, WALL ST. J., May 10,
2008 at A9, http:/online.wsj.com/article/SB121037876256182167.html; Lynn Lofton, Medical Liability
Improvements Holding Steady With Tort Reform, Miss. Bus. J., Feb. 4, 2008 at B4, 2008 WLNR
4623679; Lex Taylor, Editorial, Mississippi is Seeing the Benefits of Tort Reform, SUN HERALD (Biloxi,
Miss.), Sept. 29,2006 at D2, 2006 WLNR 16871877; Lynne Jeter, Mississippi Tort Reform: The Doctor Is
In - Again, Miss. Bus. J., July 12, 2004, at B2, 2004 WLNR 11615861.
6. See Nash Nunnery, Q&A: Jim Rosenblatt, Dean Mississippi College School of Law, Jackson,
Miss. Bus. J., Apr. 11, 2010, 2010 WLNR 27779574 (according to former Dean Rosenblatt, "Tort Re-
form has made a difference in Mississippi and in a number of other states. The caps on damages
combined with greater difficulty in aggregating cases has reduced the number of lawsuits."). Another
significant reform was Mississippi's move from joint to several liability. See Miss. CODE Arm. § 85-5-7
(2015).
7. See Behrens & Silverman, supra n.1 at 410-12.
8. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3(1) (prior to 2002) (amended 2002).
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Counties).9 60 Minutes crowned Jefferson County the "jackpot justice cap-
ital of America."'10 More than 21,000 people were plaintiffs in Jefferson
County between 1995 and 2000, even though the county had fewer than
10,000 residents.1 ' Eager for business, more out-of-state lawyers licensed
in other jurisdictions took the Mississippi Bar exam in February 2004 than
Mississippi residents.12 Even a federal appellate court recognized that Mis-
sissippi's state courts were "a mecca for plaintiffs' claims against out-of-
state businesses.'
13
The Legislature tightened Mississippi's venue requirements for medi-
cal malpractice claims in 2002 and for other lawsuits in 2004. Now, mal-
practice lawsuits against health care providers "shall be brought only in the
county in which the alleged act or omission occurred."'4 Other lawsuits
"shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a
corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county
where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial
event that caused the injury occurred.'1 5 Product liability suits may also be
brought in the county where the plaintiff obtained the product.16 If venue
cannot otherwise be asserted against an out-of-state defendant in a general
civil action, the plaintiff may bring the action where he or she resides or is
domiciled.'7 Mississippi courts now grant defendants' motions to transfer
cases that lack a sufficient relationship to the forum. 8
9. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N., BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2003 at 6-7, 15
(2003), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2003.pdf; AM. TORT REFORM
Ass'N., BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002 at 10-11 (2002), http://www.judicialhellholes
.org/wp-content/uploads /2010/12/JH2002.pdf.
10. 60 Minutes, Jackpot Justice (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 24, 2002).
11. Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIms, Aug. 20, 2001, at Al, http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/08/20/us/mississippi-gaining-as-lawsuit-mecca.html.
12. More Than Half of February Bar Exam Takers Out-of-Staters, Miss. Bus. J., June 7, 2004, at
10.
13. Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 2001).
14. H.B. 2, 3d Ex. Sess., § 1 (Miss. 2002) (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3(3) (2015)).
15. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (2015); see also Med. Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers,
956 So. 2d 213, 219 (Miss. 2007) ("The venue statute does not allow the piling on of acts or events to
establish venue. It specifically requires a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event to
have happened in a particular jurisdiction in order for venue to be proper there").
16. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(ii) (2015).
17. Id. at § 11-11-3(1)(b) (2015).
18. See, e.g., Holmes v. McMillan, 21 So. 3d 614, 620 (Miss. 2009) (finding venue to be proper in
Rankin County and that trial court erred in finding venue to be proper in Hinds County in action
arising out of automobile accident); Myers, 956 So. 2d at 220 (transferring claim challenging nonrenewal
of insurance policy from Holmes to Madison County where all deliberations, meetings, correspondence,
and communication between the insurer and doctor occurred); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Sumlin, 942
So. 2d 766, 771 (Miss. 2006) (finding that patient's obtaining echocardiogram in Smith County did not
establish venue in product liability claim against pharmaceutical company where plaintiff obtained the
prescription, filled it, and ingested the pills in Wayne County).
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Mississippi also ended the "good for one, good for all" rule, which had
permitted a lawsuit to be brought in any Mississippi county in which a sin-
gle plaintiff resided or where venue was otherwise proper for any party.19
Today, "each plaintiff shall independently establish proper venue."2 0 Plain-
tiffs' lawyers cannot use one anchor client in the desired county to file a
lawsuit than includes many other plaintiffs from around the state or
country.
Even with the significant limits on venue, the Legislature recognized
that people who lived, worked, and were injured outside of Mississippi
could file lawsuits in Mississippi against companies that do business in the
state. Thus, the Legislature codified the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens.2' The doctrine allows a court to transfer a case within the
state or dismiss a claim more appropriately heard in another state, where
the plaintiff's chosen forum is inconvenient for the parties and witnesses
and a more suitable alternative forum is available.22 Consistent with prior
case law, the Legislature adopted a factor-based approach for evaluating
whether an action should be transferred to a different county in the state or
dismissed.23
The Mississippi Supreme Court has reversed trial courts that refuse to
dismiss claims of nonresident plaintiffs that have no connection to Missis-
sippi.24 For example, in an asbestos case against a respirator manufacturer,
the high court found that allowing claims by out-of-state plaintiffs "would
waste finite judicial resources on claims that have nothing to do with the
state. "25
While some areas of Mississippi continue to be viewed by businesses
and defense lawyers as pro-plaintiff,26 defendants have a greater likelihood
that state courts will dismiss cases that should be heard in another state or
transfer cases that belong in a different county within Mississippi.
19. See Senatobia Cmty. Hosp. v. Orr, 607 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Miss. 1992) (holding proper venue
over nonresident defendant makes the county of plaintiff's residence the proper venue against all resi-
dent defendants, even though they may live in different counties"), overruled by Capital City Ins. Co. v.
G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp., 889 So. 2d 505, 517 (Miss. 2004).
20. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3(2) (2015).
21. Miss. CODE ANN. 11-11-3(4)(a) (2015); see also Alston v. Pope, 112 So. 3d 422 (Miss. 2013)
(recognizing that the 2004 law codified the doctrine as first recognized in two 1943 cases).
22. Miss. CODE ANN. 11-11-3(4)(a) (2015).
23. Compare Miss. CODE ANN. 11-11-3(4)(a) (2015) with McWhorter v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc.,
913 So. 2d 193, 196 (Miss. 2005) (applying common law approach).
24. See, e.g., 3M v. Johnson, 926 So. 2d 860, 864-66 (Miss. 2006) (finding that forum non con-
veniens factors required dismissal of 18 nonresident plaintiffs' asbestos claims).
25. Id. at 866.
26. For example, the American Tort Reform Foundation included Jones County on its "Watch
List" of problem jurisdictions in 2013 largely as a result of Eighteenth Judicial District Judge Billy Joe
Landrum. See Am. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/14 at 40 (2013), http://www
.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JudicialHellholes-2013.pdf. In November 2014, after
28 years on the bench, Judge Landrum was defeated in a runoff election. See Assoc. Press, Runoffs
Settle Judicial Races in Mississippi, JACKSON FREE PRESS, Nov. 27, 2014 http://www.jacksonfreepress
.com/news/2014/nov/27/runoffs-settle-judicial-races-mississippi/.
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B. Addressing Excessive Awards
Prior to 1995, there were no verdicts greater than $9 million in Missis-
sippi courts.27 That changed between 1995 and 2001 when at least twenty-
one Mississippi juries returned verdicts of $9 million or more, seven of
which exceeded $100 million.2 8 Only Alabama (which enacted a punitive
damage limit in 1999),29 had a higher percentage of verdicts over $100 mil-
lion between 1994 and 2000.30
There appears to have been no rhyme or reason to some of these
awards. For example, in one product liability case against a pharmaceutical
company, a jury awarded ten plaintiffs $10 million each even though the
plaintiffs varied widely in age, the length of time they took the pharmaceu-
tical at issue, and in their alleged injuries.31 Another Mississippi jury
awarded $25 million each to six plaintiffs who alleged exposure to asbestos
in environments ranging from schools to shipyards.32
Excessive awards had a spiraling effect. Reports of verdicts en-
couraged plaintiffs' lawyers to bring lawsuits in Mississippi.3 One reporter
wrote in 2002: "Mississippi, largely because it is one of only a few states
that does not cap verdicts on noneconomic damages, has become a hotbed
for [personal injury] litigation because jury verdicts have been unusually
high" and "companies-fearful of paying tens of millions of dollars-are
quick to settle.
34
Nowhere was the effect of high awards more visible than in the state's
healthcare environment. Mississippi was "perhaps the hardest hit of the
[American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] 'red alert
states.' ",3 Most Mississippi cities with populations of less than 20,000 peo-
ple had no local obstetricians.36 Orthopedists paying $10,000 to $15,000
annually for insurance in the late 1980s saw their rates climb to $200,000 in
27. David Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Overview of the Unique Aspects of Mississippi's
Civil Justice System, 71 Miss. L.J. 359, 362 (2001).
28. Id. at 362-63.
29. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(d) (2015) (limiting punitive damages in cases involving physical
injuries to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $1.5 million, indexed to inflation).
30. Clark, supra n.27 at 363-64.
31. See Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31, 36 (Miss. 2004) (reversing verdict
due to improper joinder and due to improper transfer of venue to Claiborne County, where defendant
could not receive a fair trial, and finding that damages awarded by the jury were based entirely on
passion and prejudice).
32. See 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 2005) (granting JNOV for defendant due to lack
of evidence).
33. See Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001 at Al,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/20/us/mississippi-gainin g-as-lawsuit-mecca.html.
34. Tim Lemke, Best Places to Sue?; Big Civil Verdicts in Mississippi Attract Major Litigators,
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2002 at Al, 2002 WLNR 402634.
35. Sarah Domin, Comment, Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone? Women's Access to
Healthcare in Jeopardy: Obstetrics and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 53 CATH. L. REv. 499,
501 (2004).
36. See Mark A. Behrens, Medical Liability Reform: A Case Study of Mississippi, 118 OBSTET-
RICS & GvNI.COLOGY 335, 335 (Aug. 2011).
2015]
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2001 and 2002. 37 It had become "almost impossible for many doctors" to
obtain affordable medical liability insurance.38 Residents of some counties
lacked a hospital with an emergency room, were hard pressed to find a
neurosurgeon, and had to drive over an hour to have a doctor deliver a
baby.39
Unchecked liability for other defendants caused employers and insur-
ers to leave or avoid doing business in Mississippi, taking jobs with them.4 °
"By the summer of 2001, at least forty-four insurance companies had left
Mississippi or stopped selling certain kinds of insurance because of large
jury verdicts in the state."'4 1 Manufacturing jobs dropped by fifteen percent
(from 260,000 to 221,500) between late 1994 and May 2001.42
Mississippi consumers also felt the effects of excessive awards. As one
commentator noted, "[t]he cost of goods and services increases more in
Mississippi because companies are trying to cover money that could be lost
in civil court cases.""43 Mississippi consumers paid almost $80 million more
for goods and services because of the state's legal system.41 "Plainly, the
unbalanced judicial system [was] hurting the state and the prospects for
more and better jobs, better incomes, and available healthcare.
' 45
The Legislature took a three-pronged approach to address Missis-
sippi's reputation for extraordinary awards. It reduced the chance that a
punitive damage award would bankrupt a business operating in the state,
placed reasonable limits on noneconomic damages, and eliminated duplica-
tive "hedonic damages. 
'
46
These reforms, combined with other procedural safeguards, have de-
creased the number of outlier awards in Mississippi. In a 2011 report,
NERA Economic Consulting found that Mississippi went from hosting
twelve of the top 100 verdicts in 2002 to zero in each of the years from 2006
to 2008, a change NERA attributed to "an apparent improvement in the
legal environment in Mississippi since 2002."' 47 That trend has continued.
37. See Megha Satyanaryana, Back on Doctors' Radars: Mississippi's Tort Reform Eases Medical
Malpractice Blues, SUN HERALD, Nov. 18, 2007 at G1, 2007 WLNR 22894270.
38. Lemke, supra n.34 at Al.
39. See Geoff Pender, Mississippi Tort Reform at 10 Years, CLARION LEDGER, May 5, 2014 at
Al, http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/05/05/mississippi-tort-reform-years/8750203/.
40. See Sherman Joyce & Michael Hotra, Mississippi's Civil Justice System: Problems, Opportuni-
ties and Some Suggested Repairs, 71 Miss. L.J. 395 (2001); Clark, supra note 27 at 365-67.
41. Clark, supra n.27 at 364.
42. See John Porretto, Big-Money Verdicts Challenge Rural Areas, ROME NEws-TRIB., July 1,
2001 at B9, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=348&dat=20010701&id=tYvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
LjUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6823,94357.
43. Timothy Brown, Study Tallies Legal System's Cost to Consumers: Goods, Services $80M
More Than in Other States, Says Economic Group, SUN HERALD, Apr. 17, 2002 at A9, 2002 WLNR
3564329.
44. Id.
45. Clark, supra n.27 at 366.
46. The Mississippi Supreme Court also deserves credit for controlling excessive awards. See
Behrens & Silverman, supra n.1 at 410-12.
47. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, CREATING CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWil-1: TIlE
ROLE OF TH-E LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 20 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2011), http://www.insti-
tuteforlegalreform.com/ uploads/sites/l/EconomicGrowthWorkingPaperOct2ol1_0.pdf.
[VOL. 34:113
BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION
Only one Mississippi case made the National Law Journal's list of Top 100
Verdicts for each of 2012 and 2013, and no Mississippi case made the list of
Top 100 Verdicts of 2014.48
1. Limiting Extraordinary Punitive Damage Awards
Mississippi's reputation for extraordinarily large verdicts often re-
sulted from punitive damages. Prior to 2002, the Mississippi Legislature
adopted reforms to reduce the chance for prejudicial practices that result in
large awards and limited punitive damages to instances of proven miscon-
duct.49 If a trial resulted in an extraordinary punitive damage award, how-
ever, Mississippi law allowed the verdict to stand unless it "[wa]s so
excessive that it evince[d] passion, bias, and prejudice on the part of the
jury so as to shock the conscience of the court."50 That standard was diffi-
cult for defendants to meet. The Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld
punitive damage awards as much as 150 times the amount of actual
damages.51
The Legislature responded by enacting a sliding scale limit on punitive
damages based on a defendant's net worth.52 The cap, initially enacted in
2002 and reduced for all but the largest businesses in 2004, provides that a
punitive damage award cannot exceed $20 million for a defendant with a
net worth of more than $1 billion; $15 million for a defendant with a net
worth between $750 million and $1 billion; $5 million for a defendant with
a net worth between $500 million and $750 million; $3.75 million for a de-
fendant with a net worth between $100 million and $500 million; $2.5 mil-
lion for a defendant with a net worth between $50 million and $100 million;
or two percent of a defendant's net worth for a defendant with a net worth
of $50 million or less.53
About one-half of the states limit54 or bar punitive damages.55 Missis-
sippi's approach is more modest han most other states with statutory limits
48. Top 100 Verdicts of 2014, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 2014, http://www.nationallawjournal.com!
id=1202721923983/Chart-Top-100-Verdicts-of-2014; Top 100 Verdicts of 2013, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 2014,
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202647966490/Top-100-Verdicts-of-2013?sreturn=20150110191
257; Top 100 Verdicts of 2012, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
id=1202590584811/Top-100-Verdicts-of-2012. Two Mississippi cases made the list of Top Verdicts of
2011. See Top 100 Verdicts of 2011, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.nationaHawjournal.com/id=
1202544721268/TOP-100-VERDICTS.
49. For example, Mississippi law provides that "[i]n any action in which the claimant seeks an
award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to
be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(b), (c) (2015). To qualify for a punitive damage award, a plaintiff must show
"clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant acted with "actual malice, gross negligence which
evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud."
Id. § 11-1-65(a) (2015).
50. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tuckier, 826 So. 2d 679, 691 (Miss. 2002).
51. Id. (citing Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So. 2d 437, 445 (Miss. 1999)).
52. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (2015).
53. Id.
54. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.020(f)-(h) (2015); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(1)(a) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73
(2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f), (g) (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 (2015); IND. CODE ANN.
20151
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
on punitive damages.56 Many states, including those near Mississippi, limit
punitive damages to a fixed amount or a certain multiple of compensatory
damages." Mississippi's cap may allow punitive damages in some cases
that are significantly higher than what other states with caps would allow,
but at least the law protects employers from excessive awards that could
cause them to shut down or leave the state. Mississippi's punitive damages
cap also helps preserve resources needed to compensate future plaintiffs by
limiting the size of windfall awards to earlier-filing plaintiffs.58
2. Constraining Outlier Pain and Suffering Awards
Mississippi also constrained outlier pain and suffering awards. Histori-
cally, in Mississippi and nationwide, noneconomic damages were modest
and large awards were typically reversed.59 The size of pain and suffering
awards took its first leap after World War II as personal injury lawyers
§ 34-51-3-4 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.28-A § 2-804(b) (2015)
(wrongful death); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2015); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25'
(2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.03.2-11(4) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (2015); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (2015); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.505 (2015) (healthcare providers); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-32-530 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 (2015); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.008 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-29 (2015); Wis. STAT.
§ 895.043(6) (2015).
55. Nebraska bars punitive damages on state constitutional grounds. Louisiana, Massachusetts,
and Washington, and New Hampshire permit punitive damages only when authorized by statute. Mich-
igan recognizes exemplary damages as compensatory, rather than truly punitive. Connecticut has lim-
ited what they call punitive recovery to the expenses of bringing the action. See Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495 (2008).
56. A few states take a similar net worth approach to limiting punitive damages. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2015) (limiting punitive damage awards to the lesser of $10 million or 3% of
a defendant's net worth); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (2015) (limiting punitive damages against
individuals and small businesses to the lesser of two times compensatory damages or 10% of the indi-
vidual's or employer's net worth up to a maximum of $350,000); see also ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2015)
(in nonphysical injury cases, limiting punitive damages against mall businesses with a net worth of less
than $2 million to $50,000 or 10% of net worth up to $200,000).
57. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(d) (2015) (limiting punitive damages in cases involving physi-
cal injuries to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $1.5 million, indexed to inflation);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.725 (2015) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of three times compensa-
tory damages or $500,000 subject to certain exceptions); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f), (g) (2015)
(limiting punitive damages to $250,000 unless the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant acted with a
specific intent to harm); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (2015) (limiting punitive damages to the greater
of $100,000 or compensatory damages, or greater of $500,000 or two times compensatory damages or
the amount of the increased financial gain where the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant acted with malice or an insurer intentionally acted in bad faith, and lifting limit when
there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or insurer acted intentionally and with
malice and engaged in life-threatening conduct); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 (2015) (limiting puni-
tive damages to the greater of two times compensatory damages or $500,000 subject to certain excep-
tions); Tix. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (2015) (limiting punitive damages to the greater
of two times economic damages plus amount equal to noneconomic damages up to $750,000, or
$200,000).
58. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Punitive Damages in Asbestos Personal Injury
Litigation: The Basis for Deferral Remains Sound, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 50 (2011).
59. See Ronald J. Allen & Alexia Brunet Marks, The Judicial Treatment of Noneconomic Com-
pensatory Damages in the Nineteenth Century, 4. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 365, 379-87 (2007) (finding
that there was no tort case prior to the 20th century that permitted a noneconomic damage award that
exceeded $450,000 in current dollars).
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became adept at enlarging these awards.6" Because "juries are left with
nothing but their consciences to guide them,"'" the size of pain and suffer-
ing awards expanded unpredictably.62 Early academic concern went
unheeded. 63
By the 1970s, "in personal injuries litigation the intangible factor of
'pain, suffering, and inconvenience' constitute[d] the largest single item of
recovery, exceeding by far the out-of-pocket 'specials' of medical expenses
and loss of wages."' 64 Pain and suffering awards became the "grist for the
mill of our tort industry. ' 65 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
pain and suffering awards accounted for approximately one-half of tort
awards in 2005.66
In Mississippi, concern about outlier awards and access to care led the
Legislature to limit noneconomic damages to $500,000 in medical liability
actions,67 among other medical liability reforms.68 The 2002 law, which ap-
plied to causes of action filed on or after January 1, 2003, received over-
whelming bipartisan support. Mississippi is one of many states that have
adopted a noneconomic damages limit applicable to health care liability.
69
60. See Melvin M. Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1951); see also Philip L. Mer-
kel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-Twentieth Century: A Retrospective Review of the Problem and
the Legal Academy's First Responses, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545, 560-65 (2006) (examining post-war ex-
pansion of pain and suffering awards).
61. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. Rlv. 772, 778
(1985).
62. Commentators have noted the difficulty expressed by jurors in putting a price on pain and
suffering. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(4), at 383 (2d ed. 1993) ("Pain cannot be mea-
sured in a market .... The result is that there is almost no standard for measuring pain and suffering
damages, or even a conception of those damages or what they represent."); Neil Vidmar, Empirical
Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 253-54 (1993) (observing different approaches by juries regarding
noneconomic damages awards; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1965) ("There
is no scale by which . . suffering can be measured and hence there can only be only a very rough
correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the extent of the suffering.").
63. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200 (1958)
(expressing concern over the ease of proof of pain and suffering and the unpredictability of such awards
and proposing "a fair maximum limit on the award").
64. Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1971).
65. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort
System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2004).
66. See Thomas H. Cohen, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 6 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Nov. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05
.pdf.
67. H.B. 2, 2002 Leg., 3d Ex. Sess., § 7 (Miss. 2002) (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(a)
(West 2015)).
68. See, e.g., id. §§ 5 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36(15) (2015)) (requiring plaintiffs to
give sixty days written notice before commencing a medical malpractice suit), 6 (codified at Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-58(1)(a) (2015)) (requiring plaintiffs' attorney to submit an affidavit certifying that an ex-
pect has concluded that there is a reasonable basis upon which to commence a medical negligence
case).
69. See Miss. CODE § 11-1-60(2)(a) (2015); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.549 (2015); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333.2 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2015); IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2015); LA. REV.
STAT. § 40:1299.42 (2015); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE § 3-2A-09 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231
§ 60H (2015); MICH. CoM. LAWS § 600.1483 (2015); Mo. REV. CODE § 538.210 (2015 Mo. S.B. 239);
MONT. CODE § 25-9-411 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2015);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.19 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02
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In early 2004, Governor Haley Barbour said "the cap on non-eco-
nomic damages should not apply just to medical liability cases .... We
should also have a reasonable cap in general civil liability cases."70 The
Legislature responded by allowing noneconomic damages up to $1 million
in civil suits not involving medical negligence. In doing so, Mississippi
joined other states that have placed a ceiling on noneconomic damages in
all civil cases to create predictability in the law, facilitate settlements, and
promote economic growth.7 1 The Legislature also removed exceptions and
scheduled increases to the $500,000 cap on noneconomic damage awards in
medical liability actions.
In enacting these limits, the Legislature drew a careful balance. Re-
coveries for past and future medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, lost
wages, or other economic damages were left uncapped. The Legislature
chose a substantial, but not unlimited, remedy for the distinct minority of
Mississippians who may find themselves as plaintiffs seeking extraordinary
noneconomic losses. Mississippi's noneconomic damages caps help avoid
inconsistent, excessive, and unpredictable awards that may raise due pro-
cess issues.72 In addition, the caps help stabilize or lower insurance costs
for doctors, drivers, businesses, and homeowners.
As discussed in more detail later in this article, Mississippi's limit on
noneconomic damages in medical negligence cases has significantly im-
proved the medical liability climate in the state. The general imit on pain
and suffering awards in personal injury cases and other reforms also had a
positive effect. For example, soon after enactment of the 2004 reforms,
three major insurance companies returned to Mississippi (World Insurance
Co., Equitable Life Insurance Co., and Travelers).7 3 Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Company and its affiliates re-entered the market for munici-
pal bonds, explaining that "[b]y enacting significant legal reform, Missis-
sippi... paved the way for possible MassMutual investments supporting
(2015); OHIO REV. CODE § 2323.43 (2015); S.C. CODE § 15-32-220 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-
11 (2015); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & RvM. CODE § 74.301 (2015); UTAH CODE § 78B-3-410 (2015); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-581.15 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2015); see also 27 V.I.C.
§ 166b (2015).
70. Hon. Haley Barbour, 2004 State of the State Address (Jan. 26, 2004).
71. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(b) (2015); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010; COLO. REV.
STAT. §13-21-102.5 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (2015); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-19a01 to -19a02 (2015); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE § 11-108 (2015); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (2015); 23 OKLA. STAT. § 61.2 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-102 (2015).
72. See Niemeyer, supra note 65 at 1414 ("The relevant lesson learned from the punitive dam-
ages experience is that when the tort system becomes infected by a growing pocket of irrationality, state
legislatures must step forward and act to establish rational rules."); see also Gilbert v. Daimler Chrysler
Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 400 n.22 (Mich. 2004) ("A grossly excessive award for pain and suffering may
violate the Due Process Clause even if it is not labeled 'punitive."'); Mark Geistfeld, Due Process and
the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 333 (2006) ("the
[Supreme] Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)... dentified four
different constitutional 'concerns' that justify constraining [punitive damages] as a matter of due pro-
cess. Each of these concerns also applies to pain-and-suffering damages ....
73. See Behrens & Silverman, supra n.1 at 422.
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Mississippi schools, roads and senior citizens. ' 74 George Dale, Missis-
sippi's long-serving Insurance Commissioner, proclaimed, "[t]hose who
said tort reform would do no good were wrong.
75
3. Eliminating Duplicative "Hedonic Damages"
The 2002 tort reform law also stopped duplicative recovery of "he-
donic" damages awarded for lost enjoyment of life.76 Damages for loss of
enjoyment of life are intended to compensate an injured person for the loss
of quality of life or the value of life itself. Prior to 2002, the Mississippi
Supreme Court considered hedonic damages appropriate to remedy the
lost enjoyment of "going on a first date, reading, debating politics, the
sense of taste, recreational activities, and family activities. ' 77 The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court had recognized lost enjoyment of life as a separate
form of damages apart from pain and suffering, which the court distin-
guished as "physical and mental discomfort caused by an injury, such as
anguish, distress, fear, humiliation, grief, shame, and worry."78 The court
had allowed a serial expert witness, whose testimony many other courts
rejected,79 to suggest to juries how much to award for the lost value of
life.80 The court also permitted damages for lost enjoyment of life in
wrongful death actions, even where death was instantaneous81 or occurred
shortly after the injury.82
Hedonic damages are problematic because considering lost enjoyment
of life separate from pain and suffering creates a significant risk of double
compensation.83 Asking juries to reach not one, but two, subjective
noneconomic damage awards raises the likelihood of excessive awards.
Hedonic damages also challenge important, time-tested principles underly-
ing wrongful death statutes and survivorship actions, which usually limit
recovery to pecuniary loss.
Under Mississippi's 2002 reform law, in personal injury actions there is
''no recovery for loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages
apart from pain and suffering damages, and there shall be no instruction
given to the jury which separates loss of enjoyment of life from pain and
74. Tort Reform Convinces MassMutual to Re-Enter Miss. Municipal Bond Market, INs. J., June
17, 2004, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2004/06/17/43318.htm; see also Shelly Sigo,
MassMutual Ends Mississippi Boycott After Tort Reform Passes, BOND BUYER, June 23,2004 at 6, 2004
WLNR 1267176.
75. Jerry Mitchell, Tort Reform Brings Insurance Firm Back to Miss., Dale Says, CLARION-
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 8, 2004 at Al, 2004 WLNR 23140503.
76. See H.B. 19 3d Ex. Sess., § 10 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-69 (2015)).
77. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 381 (Miss. 2001).
78. Id.
79. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Caul-
dron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1061-67 (2004).
80. See Johnson, 798 So. 2d at 382-83.
81. See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 2002) (en banc).
82. See Dorrough v. Wilkes, 817 So. 2d 567 (Miss. 2002) (permitting hedonic damages in a wrong-
ful death action where the decedent was aware and conscious of her injury for 29 hours before death).
83. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra n.79 at 1044-50.
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suffering.'8 4 The statute also provides that loss of enjoyment of life is not
recoverable in wrongful death actions,85 and clarifies that expert testimony
is not admissible on the value of pain and suffering or the value of life.86
C. The Judiciary Shares Credit for Mississippi's Turnaround
While the Legislature's civil justice reform achievements receive sig-
nificant attention, the Mississippi Supreme Court's role in fostering a more
predictable and fair legal environment should not be overlooked.
For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court acted to protect a defen-
dant's right to appeal an astronomical award. Prior to 2001, Mississippi
court rules required a judgment debtor to post a bond in the full amount of
the judgment plus interest in order to stay execution of the judgment dur-
ing an appeal. This rule could leave defendants hit with run-away verdicts
with a choice between filing for bankruptcy or settling, even if the judg-
ment resulted from a prejudicial process or egregious errors. This issue
came to a head in Mississippi after a $500 million verdict against a Cana-
dian funeral home chain in an action brought by a local competitor.87 The
defendant had to settle the case for $175 million because it could not afford
to post a bond equal to the company's approximate net worth.88
Soon thereafter, the Mississippi Supreme Court limited appeal bonds
for the punitive damages part of a judgment to the lesser of 125% of the
judgment, ten percent of the net worth of the defendant, or $100 million
"[a]bsent unusual circumstances."89 When the court made the change in
2001, Mississippi was among the first states to adopt an appeal bond cap
that applied to all defendants in all civil actions.9 ° Now, most states limit
appeal bonds, and several have adopted a lower limit than Mississippi.9
84. MIss. CODE. ArN. § 11-1-69(1) (2015).
85. MIss. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-69(2) (2015). The Mississippi Supreme Court recently found that it
is reversible error for a trial judge to instruct the jury to consider the "value of life" in awarding wrong-
ful death damages. See Laney v. Vance, 112 So. 3d 1079, 1081 (Miss. 2013) (reversing $1 million verdict
in medical malpractice case based on improper jury instruction and prejudicial argument).
86. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-1-69(1) (2015).
87. See Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant's Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Re-
form, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1128-29 (2006) (discussing O'Keefe v. The Loewen Group, No. 91-67-
423 (Cir. Ct., Hinds Co., Miss. 1995)).
88. See Nina Bernstein, Funeral Chain Settles, Avoiding a Big Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996 at
D5, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/30business/funeral-chain-settles-avoiding-a-big-bill.htmi.
89. See Miss. R. App. R. 8(b)(2) (as amended in 2001).
90. Some of the early states to adopt appeal bond caps applied the limit only to tobacco compa-
nies to protect the state's recovery of funds under the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 20.035.1 (2015) (enacted 2001); W. VA. CODE § 4-11A-4 (2015) (enacted 2001).
91. Many states limit appeal bonds to $25 million. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 16-55-214 (2015);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2108 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-16-125 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-46
(2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-26 (2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-49-5-3 (2015); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.2607(1) (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-289 (2015); N.D. CENTir. CODE § 28-21-25 (2015); OKLA.
STAr. ANN. tit. 12 § 990.4(B)(5) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-9-130(A)(1) (2015); S.D. Sup. CT. R. 03-
13 (2015); TErN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-124 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1 (2015); Wyo. STAT. § 1-
17-201 (2015); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-12-103 (2015) ($50 million).
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The Mississippi Supreme Court also amended the Mississippi Rules of
Evidence to address the state's past reputation for "extremely liberal stan-
dards for the admissibility of scientific evidence.'9 2 The court adopted the
federal court Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacueticals, Inc9 3 expert evi-
dence standard,94 expressing confidence that "our learned trial judges can
and will properly assume the role as gatekeeper on questions of admissibil-
ity of expert testimony."95 The Mississippi Supreme Court has continued
to ensure that trial court judges fulfill this important gatekeeping
responsibility.96
The Mississippi Supreme Court continued this progress when it held
that joinder of multiple plaintiffs who had little in common beyond the
product they claimed injured them would "unavoidably confuse the jury
and irretrievably prejudice the defendants."97 The court also added a com-
ment to Mississippi's joinder rule to clarify that there must be "a distinct
litigable event linking the parties."98 The court has reversed several mass
joinders of pharmaceutical claims and asbestos claims, typically requiring
severance, transferring to proper venues, and dismissing out-of-state plain-
tiffs whose lawsuits had no connection to Mississippi.99
Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court has demonstrated a will-
ingness to accept and act on interlocutory appeal petitions to address mis-
joinder and other abuses. In July 2004, the court streamlined the
interlocutory appeal process to eliminate he need to request certification
from the trial court.100 The court announced that it would rule based on
92. David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 27
(2004).
93. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94. Miss. R. Evil. 702 (amended 2003).
95. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 40 (Miss. 2004).
96. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Gaines, 75 So. 3d 41, 45-46 (Miss. 2011) (reversing $7 mil-
lion judgment in case alleging brain damage from lead paint where plaintiff's expert failed to consider
the dose-response ratio and instead engaged in a "classic logical fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc
['After this, therefore, because of this']."); McKee v. Bowers Window & Door Co., 64 So. 3d 926, 935-
36 (Miss. 2011) (affirming trial court decision excluding expert witness who offered testimony that
wooden windows are defective based on no outside sources, industry standards, or building codes be-
cause it was "nothing more than unsupported speculation or subjective belief, lacking any semblance of
an underlying reliable principle and method") (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
97. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1098 (Miss. 2004) (en banc).
98. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 (amended 2004).
99. See, e.g., Alexander v. AC & S Inc., 947 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 2007); Albert v. Allied Glove Corp.,
944 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2006); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 912 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 2005); Amchem Prod.,
Inc. v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 853, 855 (Miss. 2005); 3M Co. v. Hinton, 910 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 2005); 3M Co.
v. Johnson, 895 So. 2d 151 (Miss. 2005); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Jackson, 883 So. 2d 91 (Miss.
2004); Culbert v. Johnson & Johnson, 883 So. 2d 550 (Miss. 2004); Harold's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Mangi-
alardi, 889 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Scott, 876 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 2004);
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31 (Miss. 2004).
100. Miss. R. App. P. 5(e) (amended 2004) ("The Court may in its discretion expedite the appeal
and give it preference over ordinary civil cases. If the Court determines that the issues presented can be
fairly decided on the petition, response and exhibits presented, the Court may decide those issues si-
multaneously with the granting of the petition, without awaiting preparation of a record or further
briefing.").
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petition papers in appropriate cases without waiting for a full record and
further briefing, as before.'0 '
11. Two CASE STUDIES OF MISSISSIPPI CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM SUCCESSES
A. Limiting Noneconomic Damages Expands Access to Healthcare
As a result of Mississippi's 2002 and 2004 civil justice reforms, "the
problems in malpractice insurance seem to have abated.'' 10 2 The Missis-
sippi State Medical Association reports that the liability climate has im-
proved significantly since the enactment of medical liability reform."3
Another report recently declared Mississippi to have "one of the top five
most improved medical liability climates."10 4
The contrast in physician liability insurance premiums before and after
the enactment of limits on noneconomic damages in medical liability cases
and other civil justice reform in Mississippi is dramatic. From 2000 to 2004,
insurance premiums for the Medical Assurance Company of Mississippi
(MACM), the state's largest medical liability insurance carrier, increased
ninety-eight percent, reflecting the frequency and costs of medical liability
litigation in Mississippi before the passage of tort reform.05 On the other
hand, from 2006 to 2010, the years after tort reform in Mississippi, premi-
ums were reduced and refunds were given to physicians each year.10 6 As
summarized by the American Medical Association:
Liability premiums have decreased for the largest liability
carrier by 5 percent in 2006, 10 percent in 2007, 15.5 percent
in 2008, 20 percent in 2009 and 10 percent in 2010. Insured
physicians also received significant refunds during this time
period as well. This is in stark contrast to the crisis years
when premiums increased 12.5 percent in 2000, 11.1 percent
in 2001, 10 percent in 2002, 45 percent in 2003 and 19.4 per-
cent in 2004.107
For a hypothetical Mississippi doctor paying $4,000 for medical mal-
practice insurance in 1999, the doctor's premium peaked at nearly $10,000
101. See id.
102. Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH
& BIOMED. L. 69, 139 (2008).
103. See Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical Liability Reform - NOW! at 19 (2015 ed.), July 21,2014, https://
login.ama-assn.org/account/login.
104. Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown: A State-by-State Report Card, EMER-
GENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY, July 21, 2014, http://www.epmonthly.com/departments/subspecialties/
medico-legal/the-medical-malpractice-rundown-a-state-by-state-report-card/.
105. See Behrens, supra n.36 at 338.
106. Id.; see also Clay Chandler, MACM Has Made Good on Its Word, Miss. Bus. J., Mar. 9, 2009
at 15, 2009 WLNR 6034179.
107. Am. Med. Ass'n, supra n.103, at 19.
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as the state enacted legal reform in 2004, and would be about $3,200
now.1
0 8
These findings add support to the sizable body of literature demon-
strating that limits on noneconomic damages can significantly lower medi-
cal liability insurance premiums.10 9 On average, internal medicine
premiums are about seventeen percent less in states with limits on
noneconomic damages.10 Limits on noneconomic damages have an even
greater impact on doctors practicing in critical areas. Physicians in general
surgery and obstetrics/gynecology experience 20.7% and 25.5% lower pre-
miums, respectively, in states with caps compared to states without
limits."'
MACM data also shows that civil justice reform in Mississippi reduced
the number of professional liability lawsuits, particularly with respect to
OB/GYNs. 12 The average number of lawsuits per year against MACM-
insured physicians dropped 277 percent (from 318 to 140) from the five-
year period that preceded the reforms to the five-year period that
followed." 3
Mississippi's limit on medical liability, noneconomic damages has
other benefits too, such as reducing the costs associated with defensive
medicine (i.e., ordering tests out of excessive caution because of potential
liability)." 4 A study of malpractice lawsuits in Mississippi from 1998 to
2002-before tort reform-found that more litigious counties had higher
per capita medical expenditures from defensive practices.115 In contrast, a
2015 report on Medicare and Medicaid costs found that "[i]n Mississippi,
there was a trend of decreased expenditures after medical tort reform was
108. Med. Assurance Co. of Miss., Effect of Tort Reform on Premiums (July 21, 2015) (on file
with authors).
109. See Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 103 at 10-11.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id.; see also Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical
Malpractice Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S221 (June 2007) (study of more than
100,000 settled cases showed that caps on noneconomic damages "do in fact have an impact on settle-
ment payments."); Nelson et al., supra note 102, at 89 ("It is clear . across a number of rigorous
studies using a variety of data periods, measures and methods, damage caps have been shown to be
effective in reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums."); U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOW-
ERING COSTS By FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 15 (July 25, 2002) ("there is a substantial
difference in the level of medical malpractice premiums in states with meaningful caps ... and states
without meaningful caps.").
112. See Behrens, supra n.36 at 338.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., MASS. MED. SOC'Y, INVESTIGATION OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETrS
(2008) (reporting study results finding 83% of Massachusetts physicians reported practicing defensive
medicine; about 25% of all radiological imaging tests were ordered for defensive purposes, 28% of
those surveyed admitted reducing the number of high-risk patients they saw, and 38% reduced the
number of high-risk services performed); David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-
Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293:1 JAMA 2609, 2609 (June 1, 2005)
(finding that 93% of high-risk specialists in Pennsylvania ordered unnecessary tests, performed unwar-
ranted diagnostic procedures, and referred patients for unneeded consultations to protect themselves
from litigation).
115. See Brandon Roberts & Irving Hoch, Malpractice Litigation and Medical Costs in Mississippi,
61 HEALTH ECONOMICS 841 (2007).
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passed."'116 Defensive medicine costs are passed to consumers directly or
through insurance plans.
In addition, "[m]any studies demonstrate that professional liability ex-
posure has an important effect on recruitment of medical students to the
field and retention of physicians within the field and within a particular
state.' 117  States that limit noneconomic damages generally experience
greater increases in the number of doctors per capita.) 8 A competitive
legal environment also helps states retain physicians.1 9
The President of the Mississippi State Medical Association has said
that the legal reforms "made a sea-change in the practice of medicine in
Mississippi," changing the litigation culture of a state where malpractice
rates "went crazy" and doctors fled as a result of "jackpot justice. ' 120 Mis-
sissippi is no longer considered a "crisis" state for medical malpractice in-
surance. 1 21  "Medical malpractice tort reforms . . . are indeed helping
Mississippians have better health care opportunities and leveling the play-
ing field for physicians in the state's judicial system.'
22
The average citizen recognizes that constraining subjective
noneconomic damage awards has significant societal value and plays an im-
portant part in safeguarding access to healthcare services. For instance, in
November 2014, California voters rejected (by a two to one margin) a bal-
lot initiative ("Prop. 46") that sought to raise California's $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages in medical liability cases to $1.1 million and index it
to inflation. 23 Prop. 46 failed in every county of the state.2 4
116. New Findings From Institute of Rural Health in Medicare and Medicaid Provides New In-
sights, ST. & Loc. HEALTH L. WKLY., Jan. 15, 2015 at 16, 2015 WLNR 671456; see also Donald J.
Palmisano, Health Care in Crisis: The Need for Medical Liability Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L.
& EmTIcs 371, 377 (2005) ("malpractice reforms that directly reduce provider liability pressure lead to
reductions of 5 to 9 percent in medical expenditures without substantial effects on mortality or medical
complications."); Nelson et al., supra note 102 at 84 (studies "have found a link between the adoption of
malpractice reforms and the reduction in defensive medical practices.").
117. Robert L. Barbieri, Professional Liability Payments in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 107:3 OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 578, 578 (Mar. 2006).
118. See William E. Encinosa & Fred J. Hellinger, Have State Caps on Malpractice Awards In-
creased the Supply of Physicians?, 24 HEALTH AFF. 250 (2005).
119. See Chiu-Fang Chou & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Practice Location Choice by New Physicians:
The Importance of Malpractice Premiums, Damage Caps, and Health Professional Shortage Area Desig-
nation, 44 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1271 (2009); Daniel P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on
the Supply of Physician Services, 293 JAMA 2618 (2005); see also Joseph Nixon, Editorial, Why Doctors
Are Heading to Texas, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2008 at A9, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12109787407179
9863; Ralph Blumenthal, More Doctors in Texas After Malpractice Caps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/us/05doctors.html?pagewanted=l.
120. Tom Charlier, Medical Lawsuits Radically Declining -Tennessee, Mississippi Make it Hard to
Pursue Malpractice Case, MEMPHiS COM. APPEAL, Nov. 1, 2009 at Al (quoting Dr. Randy Easterling),
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/local-news/medical-lawsuits-radically-declining.
121. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Tort Reforms Boost Some States' Liability Outlook, AM. MED. NEWS,
Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.amednews.comarticle/20070305/profession303059955/7/.
122. Editorial, CLARION-LEDGER, Sept. 15, 2007 at A7, http://archive.clarionledger.com/article/
20070915/ OPINIONO1/709150317/Tort-reform-Barbour-didn-t-lead-fight-alone.
123. See Cal. Sec. of State, Ballot Measures by County (Dec. 10, 2014) (reporting that 66.8% of
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Plaintiffs' lawyers appear intent on challenging the constitutionality of
Mississippi's noneconomic damages caps. The Mississippi Supreme Court
has considered several such cases, but has not reached the merits of the
constitutional issue.'25
The vast majority of state courts have respected the prerogative of leg-
islatures to enact reasonable limits on pain and suffering awards in medical
liability cases126 and civil actions generally.27 Noneconomic damages caps
routinely survive right to a jury trial, 128 separation of powers,'129 equal
125. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Learmonth, 95 So. 3d 633 (Miss. 2012) (concluding that deciding
certified question regarding constitutionality of the general noneconomic damages cap would have re-
quired speculation and conjecture on the court's part); Allcock v. Bannister., 106 So. 3d 790 (Miss.
2012) (affirming trial court decision to grant defendant's motion for new trial due to faulty jury instruc-
tion and not addressing plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to cap); APAC-Tenn., Inc. v. Bryant, 2009-
CA-02009-SCT (Miss.) (appeal including constitutional challenge to limit voluntarily dismissed due to
settlement on Nov. 3, 2011); Double Quick, Inc. v. Lymas, 50 So. 3d 292 (Miss. 2010) (reversing plain-
tiffs' verdict due to lack of causation and not reaching plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to
noneconomic damage limit); see also Manhattan Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr., LLC v. Pace, 134 So. 3d
810 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing plaintiffs' verdict due to evidentiary error and not addressing
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge).
126. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Chan v. Curran, 237 Cal.
App. 4th 601 (2015); Stinnett v. Tam, 198 Cal. App. 4th 1412 (2011); Rashidi v. Moser, No. B237476,
2015 WL 1811971 (Cal. App. Apr. 20, 2015), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 339 P.3d 344
(Cal. 2014); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2004); Scholz
v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds; Kirkland
v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012);
McGinnes v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 224 P.3d 581 (Ken. App. 2010); Estate of Needham ex rel. May v. Mercy
Mem. Nursing Ctr., Nos. 303999, 304832,2013 WL 5495551 (Mich. App. Oct. 3,2013); Johnson v. Henry
Ford Hosp., No. 250874, 251542, 2005 WL 658820 (Mich. App. Mar. 22, 2005); Jenkins v. Patel, 688
N.W.2d 543 (Mich. App. 2004); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. App. 2002); Knowles v.
United States, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996), superseded by statute; Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d
841 (Tex. 1990); Prabhakar v. Fritzgerald, No. 05-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 3667400 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Aug. 24, 2012); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d
405 (W. Va. 2011); Estate of Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001); Robinson v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991); see also Mizrahi v. N. Miami Med. Ctr., Ltd., 761 So.
2d 1040 (Fla. 2000) (wrongful death); Adams v. Via Christi Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001)
(wrongful death); Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. 2012) (wrongful death); Hughes v.
Peacehealth, 178 P.3d 225 (Or. 2008) (reaffirming constitutionality of limit as applied to wrongful death
cases in Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789 (Or. 1995)).
127. See, e.g., L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown, 211 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2009); C.J. v. State, Dep't of Correc-
tions, 151 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2006); Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002); Scharrel v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1998); DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 5 A.3d 45 (Md.
2010); Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423 (Md. 1995); Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 976 A.2d 279 (Md. 2009);
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1990);
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789
P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds, Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991); see
also Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. 2004) (auto lessors' vicarious liability); Wessels v.
Garden Way, Inc., 689 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. App. 2004) (product liability actions); Kenkel v. Stanley
Works, 665 N.W.2d 490 (Mich. App. 2003) (product liability actions).
128. See L.D.G., 211 P.3d at 1131; Evans, 56 P.3d at 1051; Chan, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 629-30;
Stinnett, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 1433; Garhart, 95 P.3d at 581; Scholz, 851 P.2d at 906; Kirkland, 4 P.3d at
1120; Miller, 289 P.3d at 1118; Samsel, 789 P.2d at 555; Freed, 5 A.3d at 57; Oaks, 660 A.2d at 429;
Murphy, 601 A.2d at 118; Phillips, 685 N.W.2d at 188; Wessels, 689 N.W.2d at 529; Kenkel, 665 N.W.2d
at 499; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 737; Estate of Needham, 2013 WL 5495551 at *15; Jenkins, 688
N.W.2d at 544; Johnson, 2005 WL 658820 at *8; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 432; Knowles, 544 N.W.2d at 203;
Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 846; Judd, 103 P.3d at 144-45; MacDonald, 715 S.E.2d at 415; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d
at 888.
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protection,'130 due process,131 access to courts / right to a remedy,132 and
special legislation'3 3 challenges.
134
In addition, federal courts routinely uphold state limits on
noneconomic damages.135  As the Tenth Circuit has observed, "[w]hen a
legislature strikes a balance between a tort victim's right to recover
noneconomic damages and society's interest in preserving the availability
of affordable liability insurance, it is engaging in its fundamental and legiti-
mate role of structuring and accommodating the burdens and benefits of
economic life."' 136  More recently, the Fifth Circuit upheld Mississippi's
statutory limit on noneconomic damages in non-medical personal injury
cases.
137
129. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1056; Garhart, 95 P.3d at 583; Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1122; Miller, 289 P.3d
at 1124; McGinnes, 224 P.3d at 592; Wessels, 689 N.W.2d at 529; Kenkel, 665 N.W.2d at 501; Zdrojewski,
657 N.W.2d at 739; Estate of Needham, 2013 WL 5495551 at *16; Jenkins, 688 N.W.2d at 544; Johnson,
2005 WL 658820 at *8; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 438; Judd, 103 P.3d at 145; MacDonald, 715 S.E.2d at 415.
130. See CJ., 151 P.3d at 382; Evans, 56 P.3d at 1055; Fein, 695 P.2d at 683; Chan, 237 Cal. App.
4th at 621; Stinnett, 198 Cal. App. 4th at 1433; Scholz, 851 P.2d at 907, Scharrel, 949 P.2d at 95; Miller,
289 P.3d at 1121; Freed, 5 A.3d at 57; Oaks, 660 A.2d at 429; Murphy, 601 A.2d at 116; Phillips, 685
N.W.2d at 188; Wessels, 689 N.W.2d at 529; Kenkel, 665 N.W.2d at 500; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 739;
Estate of Needham, 2013 WL 5495551 at *15; Jenkins, 688 N.W.2d at 544; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 437;
Judd, 103 P.3d at 143; MacDonald, 715 S.E.2d at 420; Estate of Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 411; Robinson, 414
S.E.2d at 888.
131. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1055; Fein, 695 P.2d at 682; Chan, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 627; Scholz, 851
P.2d at 906; Phillips, 685 N.W.2d at 188; Kenkel, 665 N.W.2d at 500; Estate of Needham, 2013 WL
5495551 at *16; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 436; Knowles, 544 N.W.2d at 201; Judd, 103 P.3d at 144; Robin-
son, 414 S.E.2d at 888.
132. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1057; Scharrel, 949 P.2d at 95; Miller, 289 P.3d at 1118; Schweich, 463
N.W.2d at 734; Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 433; Knowles, 544 N.W.2d at 203; Judd, 103 P.3d at 141; MacDon-
aid, 715 S.E.2d at 420; Estate of Verba, 552 S.E.2d at 411; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 888.
133. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1057; Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1121; Green, 976 A.2d at 289; Wessels, 689
N.W.2d at 529; Kenkel, 665 N.W.2d at 500; MacDonald, 715 S.E.2d at 420; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 888.
134. State courts have also upheld laws that limit a plaintiff's total recovery for economic and
noneconomic losses. See Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571 (Colo.
2004); Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012); Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard
Univ., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992); Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Wolfe, 735 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. App. 2000);
Bova v. Roig, 604 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1992); St. Anthony Med. Ctr. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732 (Ind.
App. 1992); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980), overruled on other grounds, In re
Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 2007); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663
N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003); Salopek v. Friedman, 308 P.3d 139 (N.M. App. 2013); Pulliam v. Coastal Emer.
Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va.
1989); cf. Samples v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 114 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 2013);
King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 410 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1991).
135. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. Botsford Gen.
Hosp., 419 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 1996); Owen v.
United States, 935 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1991); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989); Davis v.
Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985);
Bixby v. KBR, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-632-PK, 2013 WL 1789792 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2013), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F. App'x 605 (9th Cir. 2015); Watson v. Hortman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2012);
Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D. N.M. 2002); Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
746 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1990); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989).
136. Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and
alterations omitted).
137. See Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that
noneconomic damages cap did not violate Mississippi Constitution's jury guarantee or separation of
powers provisions); see also Rieger v. Group Health Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 788, 793 (N.D. Miss. 1994)
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A few state courts have nullified noneconomic damages limits, includ-
ing the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, and Florida138-con-
trary to the majority approach. "Over the years, the scales in state courts
have increasingly tipped toward upholding noneconomic damages caps."
139
Courts upholding limits on noneconomic damages have recognized
that a court should not "second-guess the Legislature's reasoning behind
passing the act."1 40 For example, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed due
process and equal protection challenges and held that a noneconomic dam-
ages cap "bears a real and substantial relation to the general welfare of the
public.' 14' The Alaska Supreme Court also held that such laws "bear[ ] a
fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate government objective."'42
If the Mississippi Supreme Court follows its traditional respect for the
Legislature's overlapping authority to decide broad tort policy rules for
Mississippi,143 it will uphold the noneconomic damage limits. 44 The alter-
native, removing the statutory bounds on subjective pain and suffering
("[T]his court is unwilling to conclude that Mississippi courts would find limits on noneconomic recov-
ery in personal injury cases offensive and repugnant to fundamental public policy priorities.").
138. See Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010); Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem. Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (I11. 2010); Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633
(Mo. 2012); Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014); see also Moore v. Mobile
Infirmary Assoc., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (prior
statute); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.
1978); Lakin v. Senco Prods. Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988), superseded by constitutional amendment, Tex. Const. art III, § 66 (amended 2003); Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp.
Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (prior statute). But see Bixby, 2013 WL 1789792 at *30-31 (casting
doubt on viability of Lakin post-Howell, which held "the legislature is authorized to enact a limit on
tort claim recovery so long as the remaining remedy is 'substantial"').
139. Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional?
An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHics 515, 527 (2005).
140. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 69.
141. Arbino, 880 N.E.2d at 437.
142. C.J. v. State, Dep't of Corrections, 151 P.3d 373, 381 (Alaska 2006); see also Murphy v. Ed-
monds, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (Md. 1992) ("The General Assembly's objective in enacting the cap was to
assure the availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in order to cover claims for
personal injuries to members of the public. This is obviously a legitimate legislative objective.")
143. See Thomas v. Warden, 999 So. 2d 842 (Miss. 2008) (upholding pre-suit notice requirement in
medical malpractice actions); Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So. 2d 199 (Miss. 1999) (uphold-
ing Tort Claims Act statute of limitations), overruled on other grounds, recognized by Gray v. Univ. of
Miss. Sch.of Med., 996 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 2008); Vortice v. Fordice, 711 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 1998) (upholding
Tort Claims Act notice requirements); Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883
(Miss. 1994) (upholding limitation on school bus accident recoveries); Phipps v. Irby Constr. Co., 636
So. 2d 353 (Miss. 1994) (upholding statute of repose); Reich v. Jesco, Inc., 526 So. 2d 550 (Miss. 1988)
(upholding statute of limitations for actions arising from improvements to real property); Moore v.
Jesco, Inc., 531 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1988) (same); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc.,
402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981) (same); Walters v. Blackledge, 71 So. 2d 433 (Miss. 1954) (upholding Work-
men's Compensation Law).
144. See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation Between
State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(2000).
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awards, would be potentially catastrophic to the healthcare liability envi-
ronment and business climate in the state.4 5
B. Successor Asbestos-Related Liability Reform Leads to Investment
Separate from its comprehensive tort reform package, in 2004 the Mis-
sissippi Legislature enacted a law limiting the asbestos-related liabilities of
certain successor companies to the current fair market value of the prede-
cessor company's assets at the time of the merger or consolidation.146 The
law was enacted to address the application of obsolete successor liability
rules to companies that acquired asbestos liabilities through mergers before
the emergence of mass asbestos personal injury lawsuits. Of those compa-
nies, Crown Cork & Seal Co. is the most prominent example of the unfair-
ness of the law that used to prevail in most states, including Mississippi.
Crown, a company founded in 1892 by the inventor of the bottle
cap,147 has been named in asbestos personal injury claims even though the
company never manufactured, sold, or installed asbestos-containing prod-
ucts in its over 100-year history.148 Crown was swept into asbestos litiga-
tion because of its brief association with a division of a former competitor
almost half a century ago.149 In 1963, Crown purchased a majority of the
stock of Mundet Cork Co., a company that made bottle caps, just as Crown
did.150 Before the acquisition, Mundet had a side business making and in-
stalling asbestos and other insulation.'51 By the time of Crown's stock
purchase, however, Mundet had already closed its asbestos manufacturing
operations.52 Approximately ninety days after Crown obtained its stock
ownership interest in Mundet, what was left of the Mundet insulation divi-
sion-idle machinery, leftover inventory, and customer lists-was sold off
by Mundet.153 Crown itself never operated the insulation division nor ever
intended to.15 4 Crown subsequently acquired all of Mundet's stock, and
Mundet, then having only bottle-cap operations, was merged into Crown in
1966.155 The cost of the Mundet stock was approximately $7 million.'56
145. See Commentary, Lifting the Cap Would Be A Bad Economic Move For State, Miss. Bus. J.,
June 26, 2011 (editorial board opposition to striking down general noneconomic damages cap), 2011
WLNR 27974284.
146. H.B. 1517, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004) (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-33-1 to -11 (2015)).
147. See Crown History, http://www.crowncork.com/about/about-history.php.
148. See Monte Burke, An Affair to Remember, FORBES, June 11, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/ 2001/0611/060b.html; Suzanna Cervenka, Crown Cork: Jobs At Stake, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 25, 2003, at B2, 2003 WLNR 2167314.
149. See Michael S. Hull et al., House Bill 4 and Proposition 12: An Analysis with Legislative
History, Part Two, 36 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 149 (2005).
150. Id.
151. See Burke, supra n.148.
152. See Mark A. Behrens, ALEC Model Legislation to Help Sick Asbestos and Silica Claimants,
Curb Fraud, and Provide Liability Fairness to Innocent Successor Companies, STATE FACTOR (Am.





156. See Hull et al., supra n.149 at 149.
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Between 2000 and 2004, Crown's brief relationship with Mundet resulted in
plaintiffs' lawyers naming Crown as a defendant in thousands of asbestos
lawsuits that cost Crown hundreds of millions of dollars.
157
To remedy such instances of grossly disproportionate liability imposed
on innocent companies by the application of outdated successor liability
law, Mississippi was among the first states to enact a law that more fairly
considered a business's responsibility for the conduct of a merged com-
pany.158 Now, over twenty states have enacted similar laws, with most of
those states following Mississippi's lead.
159
As a result of Mississippi's reform, Crown expanded its operation and
made additional investment in Mississippi by locating its national eight-
ounce can manufacturing center in Batesville.160  Crown manufactures all
of its eight-ounce cans at the Batesville plant and ships them from Missis-
sippi to customer locations across the United States and Canada. Crown
later expanded its Batesville operation, adding the capability to manufac-
ture sixteen ounce cans.'6' In all, the company has invested several million
dollars to expand the Batesville plant. Crown has directly attributed this
investment and expansion to the successor asbestos-related liability reform
law that made "Mississippi a more attractive place for companies to invest
and grow their operations.' 62  The Batesville plant presently employs
about 225 Mississippians and is Panola County's fourth largest employer.'6 3
157. See CROWN HOLDINGS, INC., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2005), http://library.corporate-ir.net/
library/85/ 851185121/items/143713/2004annualfinal.pdf; CROWN HOLDINGS, INC., 2002 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 15 (2003), http://media.corporateir.net/media-files/irol/85/85121/DataTableUpload/2002AN-
NUAL.pdf; see also Danielle Fugazy, Environmental Issues Influence M&A Activity, 46 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKERS J. 16 (Nov. 1, 2001), 2011 WLNR 22493390.
158. See MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-33-1 to 79-33-11 (2015). Pennsylvania (2001) and Texas (2003)
were the first states to enact such reforms. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1929.1 (2015); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 149.001 to 149.006 (2015). Ohio enacted legislation along with Mississippi in 2004. See
OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.97 (2015).
159. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-680 to 6-5-685 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-559 to 12-559.03 (2015);
ARK. H.B. 1529, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015) (to be codified at ARK. CODE §§ 16-120-601 to 16-120-606
(2015)); FLA. STAT. §§ 774.002 to 774.007 (2015); GA. CODE §§ 51-15-1 to 51-15-8 (2015); IDAHO CODE
§§ 30-1901 to 30-1907 (2015); IND. CODE §§ 34-31-8 -1 to 34-31-8-12 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-
1301 to 50-1307 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3001 (2015); MISS. CODE §§ 79-33-1 to 79-33-11
(2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,283 to 25-21,289 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-40 to 99E-45 (2015);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-46-01 to 32-46-06 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.97 (2015); 76 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 102-109 (2015); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1929.1 (2015); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8368.1-8368.6 (2015); S.C.
CODE §§ 15-81-110 to 15-81-160 (2015); S.D. CODE §§ 20-9-36 to 20-9-43 (2015); TENN. CODE §§ 29-34-
501 to 29-34-507 (2015); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 149.001 to 149.006 (2015); UTAH CODE
§§ 78B-4-601 to 78B-4-607 (2015); WIs. STAT. § 895.61 (2015); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-131 to 1-1-137 (2015).
160. See Press Release, Crown Holdings Upgrades Batesville Plant, and Adds New 8 oz. Can-
Making Capability, Sept. 9, 2004, http://www.crowncork.comlpress-room/press-release.php/20040909.
161. See Press Release, Crown Increases Capability for the Manufacture of Specialty Beverage
Cans at Two North American Plants, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.crowncork.com/press-room/press-re
lease.php/20060321.
162. Lynne W. Jeter, Crown Makes $7.2M Investment in Batesville Plant, Miss. Bus. J., Mar. 13,
2006 http://msbusiness.com/blog/2006/03/13/crown-makes-72m-investment-in-batesville-plant/ (quoting
William Gallagher, Vice President, Secretary & General Counsel for Crown Cork & Seal Company,
Inc.).
163. See id.
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III. BUILDING ON PROGRESS: THE PATH FORWARD
Mississippi has not enacted significant civil justice reform since 2004,
with the exception of a law that requires a measure of transparency when
the state's attorney general hires contingency fee lawyers to enforce Missis-
sippi law.'64 Meanwhile, other states, including regional competitors such
as Tennessee,165 have enacted civil justice reforms to attract employers.
There are also some goals of the earlier reforms that have not been fully
realized and new issues that need to be addressed. Below are some addi-
tional civil justice reforms that Mississippi should adopt.
A. Strengthen the Jury Service System
"The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with
either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial
jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.'1 66 This "fair cross-sec-
tion" aspect of the jury-trial system is rooted in fundamental fairness and
has deep-seated constitutional underpinnings.16v History has demonstrated
that unrepresentative juries can lead to miscarriages of justice.
1 68
In recognition of the significance of representative juries, Mississippi's
2004 reforms instituted several "best practices" for jury service in Missis-
sippi courts. For example, the law gave each person summoned a one-time
right to reschedule-choosing another date within the next six months-
simply by contacting the court clerk. 69 This provision was intended to
make jury service more flexible and to encourage people to serve rather
than ask to be excused. The 2004 law also strengthened employment pro-
tections for jurors 70 and increased the penalty for failure to appear.171 The
Mississippi Legislature and courts have more work to do, however, with
respect to excusing jurors from service based on hardship and implement-
ing an innovative Lengthy Trial Fund that was enacted in 2004.
164. See H.B. 211 (Miss. 2012) (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-1 to -8, 7-5-21, 7-5-39 (2015)).
165. See Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, H.B. 2008, 107th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (in-
cluding venue reform, appeal bond limit, limit on noneconomic damages in healthcare liability actions,
limit on punitive damages, product-seller liability reform, regulatory compliance defense to punitive
damages, class action and consumer litigation reforms).
166. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)
167. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 552 (1975).
168. For example, in another era, two all-white, all-male Mississippi juries deadlocked in the 1964
trials of white supremacist Byron De La Beckwith for the murder of African-American civil rights
leader Medgar Evers. Beckwith was convicted and given a life sentence by a racially diverse jury in
1994.
169. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-33 (2015). The law also requires courts to reschedule the service of
an employee of a small business if another employee of that business is summoned to appear during the
same period. Id. § 14-5-35(4).
170. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-35 (2015).
171. The law increased the maximum penalty for failing to appear for jury service from $100 to
$500 and authorized courts to require a prospective juror who fails to appear to complete community
service in addition to, or in lieu of, a fine. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-34 (2015). Mississippi law also
authorizes imprisonment for up to three days for failing to appear for jury service, a punishment that
was not altered by the 2004 law. See id.
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1. Mississippi Courts Must Properly Apply the Hardship Standard
In addition to instituting a new procedure to facilitate rescheduling
jury service and other provisions intended to alleviate the burdens of such
service, the 2004 law strictly limited the ability of jurors to be excused be-
cause of "undue or extreme physical or financial hardship."'17 2 The Legisla-
ture tightly defined this standard to give courts a solid basis on which to
reject flimsy excuses when rescheduling service would suffice. Presently,
Mississippi courts may excuse jurors for hardship in only three narrow cir-
cumstances: (1) when it would be impossible for a summoned juror to ob-
tain an appropriate substitute caregiver for a person under his or her care;
(2) when the juror shows that he or she would "[i]ncur costs that would
have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the individual's neces-
sary daily living expenses or on those for whom he or she provides the
principal means of support;" or (3) when jury service would lead to illness
or disease.
173
Mississippi law has long required individuals who seek to be excused
from jury service to make their requests in open court, before a judge, and
under oath.174 This requirement serves a vital public purpose. As the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court observed, "[i]t is much easier and less embarrassing
to present a feigned excuse in private than in public. ' 175 An individual may
also be more reluctant to beg off if it appears to fellow citizens that he or
she is trying to shirk a public duty.
176
For these reasons, the 2004 law retained the requirement that only a
judge-and not a court clerk-may grant a request for an excuse.7 7 Clerks
may grant postponements and reschedule service by phone, but only judges
can excuse a prospective juror for hardship. The legislation also explicitly
forbade a court from granting a hardship excuse "solely based on the fact
that a prospective juror will be required to be absent from his or her place
of employment or business.
178
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence indicates that some Mississippi
courts are not faithfully adhering to the statutory hardship standard. At-
torneys report that in some counties, clerks, rather than judges, routinely
excuse prospective jurors from service, often with no record other than a
vague handwritten notation (for instance, "hardship") on the juror list. In
addition, in many cases only about one-half of summoned jurors even ap-
pear for court. Accordingly, by the time the venire is assembled from
172. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (2015).
173. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23(3)(a) (2015). Mississippi law also includes separate exemptions
for jurors who are incapable of service due to illness, breast-feeding mothers, and senior citizens. See
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-23(1)(c), 13-5-25 (2015).
174. See Parker v. State, 29 So. 2d 910, 911 (Miss. 1947). The lone exception to this open-court
requirement allows a summoned juror who cannot serve due to an illness to submit a physician's certifi-
cate to the clerk without appearing before a judge. See id.; see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23(2)
(2015).
175. Parker v. State, 29 So. 2d. at 912.
176. Id.
177. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 13-5-23(3)(c), (d), (e) (2015).
178. Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23(3)(b) (2015).
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which the lawyers in a given case can choose their jury-taking out the no-
shows and those impermissibly excused by court clerks-there are in-
stances in which three out of four summoned jurors are not present. As a
result, the litigants' right to a representative jury is severely threatened.1
79
In the past, the Mississippi Supreme Court has intervened when trial
courts refuse to follow the jury service laws. In 1989, for instance, the high
court in Adams v. State'80 warned trial courts that although they have some
discretion in implementing the jury selection laws, "we have never con-
doned a venire selection process completely contrary to them wherein the
clerk did that which the law expressly prohibits."18 In that case, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction arising from a case
in which the Carroll County Circuit Court had unilaterally struck senior
citizens from the jury list even though Mississippi law gives them the option
to serve.
182
Ten years later, in Page v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc.,'83 the
Mississippi Supreme Court found that its admonition had gone "unheeded"
in Jackson County, where the clerk automatically excluded all jurors who
had been summoned in the preceding two years regardless of whether they
had actually served and claimed the privilege not to serve again, as re-
quired by statute.8" Holding that such practices were not just unlawful but
"unconstitutional," the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered a new trial of a
product liability case that had resulted in a defense verdict. The court ex-
plained that Mississippi law requires a jury drawn from a "fair cross sec-
tion" of the population, because "[t]here is no question that plaintiffs and
defendants are entitled to a fair and impartial jury. ' 185 Pervasive irregular-
ities in the jury selection process "tend[ ] to threaten public confidence in
the fairness of jury trials," and thus "tend[ ] to threaten one of our sacred
legal institutions."'8 6 The Mississippi Supreme Court also "reemphasized"
that clerks must follow the jury service laws.
187
Notably, in Page, the plaintiffs alleged that "the circuit clerk also ex-
cused individuals who claimed medical conditions, financial hardships, and
work hardships without requiring them to provide an affidavit or an excuse
in open court.' 8 8 Although the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the
record was unclear on this point, the court specifically cautioned that "if
true, such exclusion by anyone except the circuit court judge would also be
179. As Mississippi law recognizes, a jury that is a "fair cross section" of the community requires
"all qualified citizens" to fulfill their "obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose."
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-2 (2015) (emphasis added).
180. 537 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1989).
181. Id. at 893-94.
182. Id. at 895.
183. 728 So. 2d 1075 (Miss. 1999).
184. Id. at 1078, 1080.
185. Id. at 1081.
186. Id. at 1082.
187. Id. at 1081.
188. Id. at 1081 n.2.
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problematic."189 If this warning has gone unheeded, and Mississippi trial
courts are not following the proper excusal procedures and hardship stan-
dard, the Mississippi Supreme Court should once again step in to ensure
that Mississippi law is being honored, not ignored.
2. The Legislature Should Implement the Lengthy Trial Fund
The 2004 law also attempted to make it easier for any person to serve
on a lengthy civil trial by making additional compensation available to ju-
rors who do not receive their regular wages during service. Petit jurors in
Mississippi now receive between $25 and $40 per day for their service.9 °
While the most civil jury trials conclude within three or four days, complex
civil cases can take more time. For example, asbestos personal injury trials
usually take about two weeks, according to the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics. 91 Jurors typically devote six to eight days in court to decide non-as-
bestos product liability cases as well as medical and other professional
malpractice claims.1 92 These are averages. Trials occasionally go signifi-
cantly longer, particularly when they involve multiple plaintiffs and defend-
ants, expert witnesses, multiple claims, or requests for punitive damages.
The average Mississippian making approximately $40,000 per year would
lose over $2,500 each month as a juror on a lengthy trial, even after collect-
ing a $40 per diem.
Presently, jurors summoned for lengthy trials are placed in a difficult
situation. They may face a choice between fulfilling their civic duty at an
extraordinary financial loss and requesting a hardship excuse.193 Missis-
sippi judges are likely to excuse such individuals for hardship.194 Courts do
not want jurors who are distracted by concerns about how they will pay
their bills.' 95 As one judge put it, jurors concerned about lost income dur-
ing trial could be "too eager to reach a quick verdict instead of engaging in
a full and careful deliberation.' 96 "That's not the juror you want," he said,
"That's not justice."'97
In complex civil cases, the result of the lack of available compensation
to those who would not earn their regular income during jury service is the
systematic exclusion of the perspectives of whole categories of people, such
as owners and employees of small businesses, and occupations, such as taxi
189. Id.
190. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 25-7-61(1)(a) (2015).
191. See Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, at 8 (U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Nov. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf.
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Call to Jury Duty Strikes Fear of Financial Ruin, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/us/02jury.html (documenting how summoned jurors for a
four to five-week trial in Florida were forced to request hardship exemptions, which the court felt
compelled to grant).
194. See, e.g., Lynne W. Jeter, Businesses Feel Bite of Jury Duty, Miss. Bus. J. (Aug. 3, 1998), http:/
/msbusiness.com/blog/1998/08/03/businesses-feel-bite-of-jury-duty/.
195. See id.
196. Schwartz, supra n.193 (quoting Judge Robert A. Rosenberg of Florida).
197. Id.
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drivers, plumbers, and construction workers. While the right to trial by
jury drawn from a cross-section of the community "does not mean, of
course, that every jury must contain representatives from economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographic groups of the community," a jury
selection system that systematically excludes any group is impermissible.'98
To help achieve more representative juries in lengthy trials, the Missis-
sippi Legislature directed the Administrative Office of Courts to promul-
gate rules to establish a Lengthy Trial Fund ("LTF"). The Fund was
intended to provide individuals who do not receive their usual income dur-
ing jury service with supplemental compensation. When a civil trial contin-
ues longer than ten days, the court would provide jurors with up to $300
per day based on documentation of the amount of income lost. The law
also authorizes courts to provide jurors with up to $100 per day for the
fourth through tenth day of service if the trial lasts longer than ten days.
In a recent program that aired on National Public Radio on "Jury
Duty in America Today," Paula Hannaford-Agor, the Director of the Na-
tional Center for State Court's Center for Jury Studies, discussed the suc-
cess of a LTF in place in Arizona since 2004. The program is so successful
in Arizona that it was reauthorized by the legislature, and juror eligibility
for compensation has been expanded several times.199 Ms. Hannaford-
Agor called the percentage of jurors who can serve on lengthy trials "amaz-
ing" as a direct result of the program.2 ° ° Oklahoma also has a LTF, she
noted, along with "one other state ... [that has not] actually put in place
the mechanics to fund it."' 2 1' That other state is Mississippi, where the 2004
legislation stated that the LTF would take effect only upon allocation of
funding.
Arizona funded its LTF through a $15 fee placed on civil complaints
and answers, as well certain other filings.20 2 That fee not only funds the
program for jurors serving on civil and criminal cases, but has resulted in
surpluses that have allowed jurors on shorter trials to access funds too. The
Arizona program now provides jurors who serve more than five days and
who do not receive their usual income to receive up to $300 for each day of
service beginning on the first day.20 The Oklahoma system, which has eli-
gibility closer to the Mississippi statute, is funded through a $20 fee placed
198. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (reversing defense judgment in negligence case
due to jury commissioner's practice of excluding from jury lists all persons who work for a daily wage).
199. See generally G. Thomas Munsterman, Arizona's Experience with the Jury Patriotism Act:
Assessing the First Year of New Jury Reforms, 45 JUDGES' J. 18 (2006); see also S.B. 1248, 51st Leg., 2d.
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (reauthorizing Lengthy Trial Fund for an additional five years); H.B. 2133, 50th
Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012) (amending LTF codified to allow jurors who serve on a trial lasting
more than five days to receive wage supplementation beginning on the first day of service).
200. Jury Duty in America, TuIE DIANE REHM SHOW (Nat'l Pub. Radio, Nov. 3, 2014), http://
thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2014-11-03/ ury-duty-in-america-today.
201. Id.
202. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-115(B) (2015) (authorizing the clerk of the Arizona Supreme
Court to establish, collect, and remit, the additional fee to fund the LTF); see also Ariz. Jud. Branch,
Superior Court Filing Fees (eff. May 19, 2014), http://.azcourts.gov//.aspx.
203. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-222 (2015).
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on civil complaints.2 °4 Since 2005, Oklahoma's LTF has provided up to
$200 per day after the fourth day of jury service for those who serve on a
civil or criminal trial lasting more than ten days.0 5
Mississippi should enact legislation providing for a court filing fee that
will fully fund the LTF without any state allocation. Currently, the fee for
filing a civil complaint in a Mississippi Circuit Court is about $160, com-
posed of various charges set by the legislature and courts.20 6 Increasing
this fee by about $10 would allow implementation of the LTF, significantly
reducing financial barriers to serving on a jury, allowing more citizens to
fulfill their civic duty to serve, and promoting more representative juries.20 7
B. Address Asbestos and Silica Litigation Abuses
1. Require Plaintiffs to be Sick to Bring or Maintain an Asbestos or
Silica Action
Since the asbestos litigation began over four decades ago, hundreds of
thousands of lawsuits-if not more-have been filed by plaintiffs who were
not sick.208 A decade ago, there were reports that up to ninety percent of
plaintiffs were unimpaired.20 9 Cardozo Law School Professor Lester
Brickman, an expert on asbestos litigation, has said, "the 'asbestos litiga-
tion crisis' would never have arisen" if not for the claims filed by the non-
204. OKLA. STAr. tit. 28, § 86(D)(2) (2015).
205. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 28, § 86(D)(4) (2015). The Oklahoma law also allows the court to pay
replacement wages of up to $50 per day for the fourth through tenth day of jury service when a juror
serves more than ten days if it finds that jury service for a particular individual is a significant financial
hardship. See id.
206. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-7-13 (2015); see also Hinds County, Mississippi, Circuit Clerk,
http://www.hindscountyms.com/elected-offices/circuit-clerk (providing for $160 civil complaint filing
fee).
207. The Mississippi LTF provides compensation to jurors serving on lengthy civil trials. It does
not extend to jurors selected for criminal trials. Arizona and Oklahoma, while funding their systems
through civil filing fees, makes LTF funds available to jurors on both civil and criminal cases. If Missis-
sippi were to expand the LTF to criminal cases, then a higher filing fee, in the $20 range, might be
needed.
208. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., Asbestos Litigation xxiv (2005); Owens Coming v. Credit
Suisse First Boston, 322 B.R. 719, 723 (D. Del. 2005) ("Labor unions, attorneys, and other persons with
suspect motives [have] caused large numbers of people to undergo X-ray examinations (at no cost),
thus triggering thousands of claims by persons who had never experienced adverse symptoms."); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass. 1989) ("[M]any of
these cases result from mass X-ray screenings at occupational ocations conducted by unions and/or
plaintiffs' attorneys, and many claimants are functionally asymptomatic when suit is filed."); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for
Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REv. 815, 823 (2002) ("By all ac-
counts, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in recent years have been on behalf of plaintiffs who
are completely asymptomatic.").
209. See Roger Parloff, Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at 186,
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2004/09/06/380311/index.htm ("Accord-
ing to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this area, two-thirds to 90% of the
nonmalignants are 'unimpaireds'-that is, they have slight or no physical symptoms."); see also Alex
Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 2002 at Al, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2002/04/10/business/ a-surge-in-asbestos-suits-many-by-healthy-plaintiffs.html
("Very few new plaintiffs have serious injuries, even their lawyers acknowledge .... 'The overwhelming
majority of these cases ... are brought by people who have no impairment whatsoever."').
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sick.2 10  Most of these filings were generated through lawyer-sponsored
screenings that are notoriously unreliable.2 t t
Mass filings by the non-sick pressured many primary historical defend-
ants to seek bankruptcy court protection in the early 2000s. Plaintiffs' law-
yers then "shifted their litigation strategy away from the traditional thermal
insulation defendants and towards peripheral and new defendants associ-
ated with the manufacturing and distribution of alternative asbestos-con-
taining products such as gaskets, pumps, automotive friction products, and
residential construction products.' 212 According to one Mississippi plain-
tiffs' lawyer, the asbestos litigation became an "endless search for a solvent
bystander. 
213
Some plaintiffs' lawyers responded to the loss of viable asbestos de-
fendants by diversifying their practices and filing silica exposure claims.21 4
Silica-quartz in its most common form-is a ubiquitous mineral.215 When
fragmented into tiny particles, such as through abrasive blasting or in foun-
dry operations, silica can be dangerous if inhaled in excess of certain levels
for a prolonged period of time.216 "The health risks of inhaling silica dust
have been well known for a very long time.
21 7
210. Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of Ag-
gregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 243, 273 (2001).
211. Owens Corning, 322 B.R. at 723 (stating that many x-ray readers hired by plaintiffs' lawyers
were "so biased that their readings were simply unreliable."). Researchers at Johns Hopkins University
compared the X-ray interpretations of B-readers employed by plaintiffs' counsel with the subsequent
interpretations of six independent B Readers who had no knowledge of the X-rays' origins. The study
found that, while the B Readers hired by plaintiffs' counsel claimed asbestos-related lung abnormalities
in almost 96% of the X-rays, the independent B Readers found abnormalities in less than 5% of the
same X-rays-a difference the researchers said was "too great to be attributed to inter-observer varia-
bility." Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of "B" Readers' Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for
Asbestos Related Changes, 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 843, 843 (Aug. 2004).
212. Marc C. Scarcella et al., The Philadelphia Story: Asbestos Litigation, Bankruptcy Trusts and
Changes in Exposure Allegations from 1991-2010, 27:1 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 1 (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.bateswhite.com/media/publication/11 media.617.pdf; see also Charles E. Bates et al.,
The Naming Game, 24:1 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 4 (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.bateswhite
.com/media/pnc/9/ media.229.pdf ("As the bankrupt companies exited the tort environment, the num-
ber of defendants named in a complaint increased, on average, from fewer than 30 on average to more
than 60 defendants per complaint."); S. Todd Brown, Bankruptcy Trusts, Transparency and the Future
of Asbestos Compensation, 23 WIDENER L.J. 299, 306 (2013) ("Defendants who were once viewed as
tertiary have increasingly become lead defendants in the tort system, and many of these defendants
have also entered bankruptcy in recent years.").
213. Richard Scruggs & Victor Schwartz, Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation - A Discus-
sion with Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 1-7:21 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 5 (Feb. 2002)
(quoting Mr. Scruggs); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation: The "End-
less Search for a Solvent Bystander," 33 WIDENER L.J. 59, 61 (2013).
214. See Mark A. Behrens & Corey Schaecher, RAND Institute for Civil Justice Report on the
Abuse of Medical Diagnostic Practices in Mass Tort Litigation: Lessons Learned from the "Phantom"
Silica Epidemic That May Deter Litigation Screening Abuse, 73 ALB. L. REV. 521, 524 (2010).
215. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior & U.S. Bureau of Mines, Crystalline Silica Primer at 2 (1992),
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/siica/780292.pdf.
216. Id. at 1-2.
217. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2004); Dresser Indus., Inc.
v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. 1993) ("Inhaling silica dust may cause respiratory disease, a risk that
has been recognized for more than a century."); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180 (1949) ("It is a
matter of common knowledge that it is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health to work in silica
dust, a fact which the defendant was bound to know.").
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Like asbestos actions, many lawsuits alleging exposure to silica have
involved persons with no demonstrable impairment.218 Claimants have
been identified through the use of interstate, for-profit, screening compa-
nies.219 Silica screening processes have been found subject to substantial
abuse and potential fraud.22 Some plaintiffs' lawyers have filed claims
against both asbestos and silica defendants, although leading medical ex-
perts agree that it is a medical rarity for someone to have both asbestos and
silica-related impairments.22'
Silica litigation abuse received national attention in 2005 when the
manager of the federal silica multi-district litigation, U.S. District Judge
Janis Graham Jack, recommended that all but one of 10,000 federal court
silica claims should be dismissed because the plaintiffs' silicosis diagnoses
were "fatally unreliable.'222 Judge Jack said, "these diagnoses were driven
by neither health nor justice: they were manufactured for money" and were
"more a creation of lawyers than of doctors.'223  Many of the cases
originated in Mississippi.
Many state legislatures and courts have responded to these abuses by
requiring plaintiffs to present credible and objective evidence of a present
physical impairment in order to bring or maintain an asbestos or silica ac-
tion.224 These laws exist in Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee (sil-
ica), Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Kansas.22 5 Mississippi should
join them.
218. See Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Liti-
gation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 519-21 (2007).
219. See David Maron & Walker W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A Closer Look at Mass
Tort Screening and The Impact of Mississippi Tort Reforms, 26 Miss. C.L. REV. 253 (2007).
220. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Stephen J. Carroll et
al., The Abuse of Medical Diagnostic Practices in Mass Litigation: The Case of Silica 2, RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2009), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2009/RANDTR774.pdf.
221. See Mike Tolson, Accusations of 'Double Dipping' Trying to Use the Same Client for 2
Different Claims - Surface / Silicosis Attorneys in Cross Hairs, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 10, 2006 at B1,
2006 WLNR 15713259; David Hechler, Silica Plaintiffs Suffer Setbacks: Broad Effects Seen in Fraud
Allegations, 27:25 NA'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2005 at 18 ("One of the most explosive revelations that has
emerged from the [federal court silica litigation] is that at least half of the approximately 10,000 plain-
tiffs ... had previously filed asbestos claims .... "), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=9000054242
03/Silica-plaintiffs-suffer-setbacks?slreturn=20150204123513.
222. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
223. Id. at 635.
224. This approach finds support in an American Bar Association resolution calling for the enact-
ment of federal asbestos medical criteria legislation to advance only those cases of individuals with
demonstrated physical impairment. See Comm'n on Asbestos Litig., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report to the
House of Delegates (2003), http:I/www.abanet.org/leadership/full-report.pdf.
225. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-14-1 to 51-14-13 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4901 to 60-4911
(2015); Oi-no REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.91-.96 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 90 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-135-30 to 44-135-110 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. 99 29-34-301 to -309 (2015); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.001-.012 (2015); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7G-1 to 55-7G-10 (2015). Similar proce-
dures exist by court rule in Chicago, New York City, Baltimore City, and Boston, among other jurisdic-
tions. See David C. Landin et al., Lessons Learned from the Front Lines: A Trial Court Checklist for
Promoting Order and Sound Public Policy in Asbestos Litigation, 16 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y 589, 614
(2008) (listing courts with inactive asbestos dockets).
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2. Transparency in Asbestos Litigation
Approximately 100 companies have been forced into bankruptcy at
least in part due to asbestos-related liabilities.226 Today, many of the com-
panies that filed for bankruptcy protection due, in part, to asbestos litiga-
tion "have emerged from the 524(g) bankruptcy process leaving in their
place dozens of trusts funded with tens of billions in assets to pay
claims. ' 227  Over sixty trusts have been established to collectively form a
$36.8 billion privately-funded asbestos personal injury compensation sys-
tem that operates parallel to, but wholly independent of, the civil tort sys-
tem.228  Consequently, compensation for asbestos-related injuries has
morphed into a two-tiered system of asbestos bankruptcy trust claims and
civil tort actions.229
The lack of transparency between the bankruptcy trust and tort sys-
tems has led to abuses.23" A widely-reported example occurred in
Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,231 where Cleveland Judge Harry
Hanna barred a prominent California asbestos plaintiffs' firm from his
court after he found that the firm and one of its partners failed to abide by
the rules of the court proscribing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepre-
sentation.232 An Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court let
226. See Lloyd Dixon et al., ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUC-
TURE AND AcrivrrY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE LARGEST TRUSTS 25 (Rand Corp. 2010); see
also Lloyd Dixon & Geoffrey McGovern, ASBFs ros BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS AND TORT COMPENSATION
xi (Rand Corp. 2011).
227. Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: A 2013 Overview of Trust
Assets, Compensation & Governance, 12:11 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 33, 33-34 (June 2013),
http://www.bateswhite.com/media/publication7_media.745.pdf.
228. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY COMPENSATION:
THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 3 (Sept. 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/
585380.pdf.
229. In a recent bankruptcy proceeding involving gasket and packing manufacturer Garlock Seal-
ing Technologies, LLC, a typical mesothelioma plaintiff's total recovery was estimated to be $1-1.5
million, "including an average of $560,000 in tort recoveries and about $600,000 from 22 trusts." In re
Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC, 504 B.R. 71, 96 (W.D.N.C. Bankr. 2014). Most recently, an unsealed
database from the Garlock bankruptcy estimation trial showed that awards to asbestos claimants repre-
sented by a dominant plaintiffs' law firm in one of the most active asbestos "magnet" jurisdictions in the
U.S. (Madison County, Illinois) have received on average more than $800,000 apiece, with a substantial
portion of those funds (approximately 41%) from bankruptcy trusts. See Heather Isringhausen Gvillo,
Database Provides Insight Into How Much Asbestos Claims Are Worth, MADISON-ST. CLAIR RE'ORDo,
May 14, 2015, http://madisonrecord.com/issues/302-asbestos/270770-database-provides-insight-into-
how-much-asbestos-claims-are-worth (38 plaintiffs in Madison County, Illinois, had lawsuits with a total
value of $21.7 million and also received $8,859,879 from various bankruptcy trusts). The recently un-
sealed database also showed that a sample of 850 asbestos claimants from across the country-"repre-
senting just a sliver of the asbestos claimant universe-have so far been awarded $334,711,143 in the
court system and $182,259,276 from the bankruptcy trust system, for a total of $516,970,419." Id.
230. See Lester Brickman, Fraud and Abuse in Mesothelioma Litigation, 88 TUL. L. Riv. 1071
(2014); Peggy L. Ableman, The Garlock Decision Should Be Required Reading for All Trial Court
Judges in Asbestos Cases, 37 Am. J. TRIAL ADV. 479 (2014); Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, FORBES,
Sept. 6, 2006, at 136, 2006 WLNR 14482372.
231. No. CV-442750 (Ohio Ct. Com. PI. Cuyahoga County Jan. 17, 2007).
232. See Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Judge Bans Calif Lawyer in Asbestos Lawsuit, CIN. POST, Feb.
20, 2007, at A3 ("A low-key judge fed up with disrespectful behavior and alleged lies by an attorney
created a stir with a courtroom ban on the lawyer from a nationally known San Francisco-area law firm
that handles asbestos-related lawsuits coast-to-coast."), 2007 WLNR 3480283.
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Judge Hanna's ruling stand.233 In Kananian, Lorillard was sued over an
asbestos-containing filter in a brand of cigarettes sold for a short time many
decades ago. When Judge Hanna allowed Lorillard's lawyers to obtain
copies of asbestos bankruptcy trust claims filed by the plaintiff they discov-
ered inconsistencies between allegations made by the plaintiff in the court
case and in his trust claims.234 The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that
Judge Hanna's decision to order the plaintiff to produce his trust claim
forms "effectively opened a Pandora's box of deceit.'235 Judge Hanna later
said, "I never expected to see lawyers lie like this .... It was lies upon lies
upon lies."
236
Most recently, in a January 2014 ruling involving gasket and packing
manufacturer Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, a federal bankruptcy
judge found that the company became a target defendant for asbestos
plaintiffs' lawyers after many of the primary historical asbestos insulation
defendants exited the tort system through bankruptcy.237 Judge George
Hodges found that Garlock's participation in the tort system then became
"infected by the manipulation of exposure evidence by plaintiffs and their
lawyers. ' 238 Evidence that Garlock needed to attribute plaintiffs' injuries
to the insulation companies' products "disappeared.' 239 Judge Hodges aid
this "occurrence was a result of the effort by some plaintiffs and their law-
yers to withhold evidence of exposure to other asbestos products and to
delay filing claims against bankrupt defendants' asbestos trusts until after
obtaining recoveries from Garlock (and other viable defendants)."2 40 The
court found that "[t]he withholding of exposure evidence by plaintiffs and
their lawyers was significant and had the effect of unfairly inflating the re-
coveries against Garlock.
' 241
The Garlock case has "laid bare the massive fraud that is routinely
practiced in mesothelioma litigation," says Cardozo Law School Professor
Lester Brickman.242 Together with other documented instances of
233. See Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. 89448 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2007) (dismissing
appeal as moot sua sponte), review denied, 878 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio 2007).
234. Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2007 at A14, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB116942159908683141; Kimberley A. Strassel, Opinion, Trusts Busted, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5,
2006 at A18, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116527814374340591.
235. James F. McCarty, Judge Becomes National Legal Star, Bars Firm from Court Over Deceit,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 25, 2007 at B1, 2007 WLNR 1527886.
236. Id.
237. In re Garlock Sealing Tech., LLC, 504 B.R. 71 (W.D.N.C. Bankr. 2014).
238. Id. at 82.
239. Id. at 84.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 86-87.
242. Sara Warner, Court Order Disrupts Asbestos World, but What of the 'Perjury Pawns'?, HUF-
FINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2014, 2014 WLNR 5632432 (quoting Prof. Brickman); see also Bankruptcy
Judge: Plaintiffs, Lawyers Covered Up Evidence in Garlock Mesothelioma Cases, LITIG. RESOURCE
CTR., Jan. 13, 2014, 2014 WLNR 1048954; Mark D. Plevin, The Garlock Estimation Decision: Why
Allowing Debtors and Defendants Broad Access to Claimant Materials Could Help Promote the Integrity
of the Civil Justice System, 23 No. 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. NL ART. 2 (Aug. 2014); Peggy L. Ableman,
A Case Study From a Judicial Perspective: How Fairness and Integrity in Asbestos Tort Litigation Can
Be Undermined by Lack of Access to Bankruptcy Trust Claims, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1185 (2014).
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evidentiary abuses in asbestos cases,243 it is becoming increasingly clear
that the problems described by Judge Hodges are not rare outliers.
Legislatures are responding to these problems by providing defend-
ants with greater access to plaintiffs' asbestos bankruptcy trust claim sub-
missions. Asbestos bankruptcy trust claim transparency laws now exist in
Texas, Arizona, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.2 44 Missis-
sippi should join these states and enact legislation to require or provide a
mechanism to require plaintiffs to file and disclose all asbestos bankruptcy
trust claims before trial. Plaintiffs would not face new burdens under such
legislation; the reform would simply change the timing of asbestos bank-
ruptcy trust claim filings to prevent gamesmanship and promote honesty in
litigation.
C. Eliminate Phantom Damages
Just as Mississippi acted to curb separate awards for "hedonic" dam-
ages that duplicated pain and suffering awards in 2004, the Legislature
should address excessive damages in the form of recovery of medical ex-
penses that neither the plaintiff nor that person's insurer ever paid. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to introduce evidence of
the full amount of billed medical expenses and recover that amount even if
the healthcare provider accepted a significantly discounted rate as full pay-
ment and wrote off the remainder of the bill. 245 The difference between
the full price listed and the amount actually paid or the reasonable value of
the service have become known as "phantom damages.
246
The issue of phantom damages is rising in importance as the practice
of hospitals and other healthcare providers of writing off or discounting
rates becomes more commonplace and the gap between amounts charged
and paid continues to grow. The gap between a healthcare provider's list
price and the amount actually paid by a patient or that person's insurer is
often dramatically different. It is common for list prices to be three, four,
or even six times higher than the amount actually paid through Medicare,
243. See William P. Shelley et al., The Need for Further Transparency Between the Tort System and
Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 2014 Update - Judicial and Legislative Developments and Other Changes
in the Landscape Since 2008, 23 WIDENER L.J. 675 (2014).
244. See TEX. H.B. 1492 (2015) (to be codified at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 90.051-
.058 (2015)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-782 (2015); OHio REV. CODE §§ 2307.951 to 2307.954 (2015);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §§ 81 to 89 (2015); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7F-1 to 55-7F-11 (2015); Wis. STAT.
§ 802.025 (2015).
245. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So. 2d 1135, 1139-40 (Miss. 2002); Brandon HMA,
Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 619-20 (Miss. 2001).
246. About one-third of the states permit plaintiffs to recover phantom damages, while about the
same number limit or bar such recoveries. The law is inconsistent or uncertain in the remainder. See
Cary Silverman, Reducing Wasteful Spending on Litigation: ALEC's Model Phantom Damages Elimina-
tion Act, INSIDE ALEC (Am. Legislative Exch. Council), Jan. 2012 at 15, http://www.alec.org/docs/
Jan2012_InsideALEC. Most recently, the high courts of West Virginia and Wisconsin allowed recovery
of phantom damages. See Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2014); Orlowski v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 810 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Wis. 2012).
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Medicaid, or a private insurer.z47 Healthcare providers often discount or
write off charges when a patient is uninsured.248 In addition, the list price
for a treatment often varies among healthcare providers-"even on the
same street, hospitals can vary by upwards of 300 percent in price for the
same service.' 249  In sum, listed rates for medical treatments are more a
matter of internal billing practices unique to the healthcare system than a
reflection of the reasonable value of medical services. Tort damages, how-
ever, are built on this foundation.
Whether a plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit can recover the "billed
amount" or the "amount actually paid" for medical expenses can signifi-
cantly impact the size of the person's recovery.. For example, in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, a person who slipped-and-fell when entering a store
on a rainy day was allowed to present evidence of $16,574.07 in medical
bills even when the hospital accepted $5,327.60 from Medicare and Medi-
caid as full payment for the services.250 The jury, allowed to only consider
the billed rate, awarded the plaintiff $100,000, including pain and suffering,
plus an additional $25,000 in loss of consortium damages to the plaintiff's
wife.
251
In cases involving more substantial injuries, the difference between the
amount billed and amount paid can reach into the hundreds of thousands
of dollars. In Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, a case against a hospital
for brain damage from alleged inadequate treatment, the court allowed the
plaintiff to introduce $326,258.28 in medical bills when Medicaid paid
$78,204.95 as payment in full for her medical treatment . 2 2  The jury re-
turned a $9 million verdict.
In both cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the introduction of
the billed rate permissible and the amount of damages not excessive.3
Considered in the aggregate, allowing use of a billed rate that does not
247. See, e.g., Press Release, National Nurses United and Institute for Health and Socio-Economic
Policy, New Data - Some Hospitals Set Charges at 10 Times their Costs, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.nation-
alnursesunited.org/ press/entry/new-data-some-hospitals-set-charges-at-10-times-their-costs/ and chart
of average cost-to-charge ratio by state http://nurses.3cdn.net/966a1l74efbe3f9adl_39m6bntzv.pdf.
248. See Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Pricing and the Uninsured: Do the Unin-
sured Pay Higher Prices?, 27 HEALTrH AFFAIRS 116, 118 (2008); see also Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why
Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Feb. 20, 2013, http://www.uta.edu/faculty/story/2311/Misc/2013,2,26
,MedicalCostsDemandAnd Greed.pdf.
249. Wilson Andrews et al., Disparity in Medical Billing, WASH. POST, May 8, 2013, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/actual-cost-of-medical-care/; see also Sarah Kliff & Dan
Keating, One Hospital Charges $8,000 - Another, $38,000, WASH. POST, May 8, 2013, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/08/one-hospital-charges-8000-another-38000/.
250. See Brief of Appellant at *2, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So. 2d 1135 (Miss. 2002)
(No. 00-CA-364), 2001 WL 34643421 at *2.
251. Frierson, 818 So. 2d at 1137.
252. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at *38, Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611 (Miss.
2001) (No. 00-CA-00735), 2000 WL 3449859 at *38.
253. Frierson, 818 So. 2d at 1145; Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d at 622. The Mississippi Supreme Court
subsequently recognized an exception to its rule allowing awards of phantom damages. In Gee v. River
Region Medical Center, 59 So. 3d 575 (Miss. 2011), the Court ruled in a medical malpractice case that a
plaintiff cannot recover from a hospital amounts that the hospital had written off because the write off
was not wholly independent of the tortfeasor. Nevertheless, the Court found that that the billed
amounts are admissible. See id. at 581-82.
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reflect the actual amount paid for the treatment means that defendants in
Mississippi courts are likely paying millions of dollars in personal injury
judgments and settlements each year that serve no compensatory
purpose.25 4
A growing number of courts and legislatures are rejecting phantom
damages.5  For example, Oklahoma and North Carolina enacted legisla-
tion in 2011 to provide that the amounts actually paid for medical expenses
are admissible at trial, not the amounts billed for treatment. 6 These states
followed Texas, which enacted a similar law in 2003.257 Mississippi should
join them.
D. Other Reforms for Mississippi
There are other ways that the Mississippi Legislature can build on
prior reforms to address obsolete rules. For example, Mississippi's pure
comparative fault rule, which allows plaintiffs to recover damages even
when they are substantially at fault for their own injuries, is an outlier
among the states.258 This rule rewards risky behavior and may encourage
frivolous litigation by people who are largely responsible for their own in-
juries. Pure comparative fault can also open the door to punitive damages
claims, complicating settlement negotiations. 9 Mississippi should adopt a
modified comparative fault system. Modified comparative fault facilitates
settlements because plaintiffs' lawyers realize that there is at least some
254. California insurers estimated that requiring compensation based on the amount billed, rather
than the amount paid based on negotiated rates and discounts, would have cost them $3 billion annu-
ally. See Dan Walters, California Supreme Court Plays Role in Tort War, SACRAMENTO BEL.t, Aug. 15,
2011, http://www.modbee.com/ 2011/08/15/1816272/dan-walters-califomia-supreme.html.
255. See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1144 (Cal. 2011).
256. See H.B. 2023, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 3009.1
(2015)); H.B. 542, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 8C, Rule 414 (2015)).
257. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (2015); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 490.715.5
(2015) (enacted 2005) (creating a rebuttable presumption that the amount actually paid represents the
reasonable value of medical expenses received); MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09(d)
(2015) (enacted 2005) ("A verdict for past medical expenses hall be limited to: (i) The total amount of
past medical expenses paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff; and (ii) The total amount of past medical
expenses incurred but not paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff for which the plaintiff or another person
on behalf of the plaintiff is obligated to pay."). The Texas Supreme Court resolved a split among its
appellate courts in 2011 by interpreting its statute to find that evidence of billed amounts of medical
expenses that cannot actually be recovered by the plaintiff are irrelevant and therefore admissible evi-
dence is limited to amounts actually paid or are payable by or on behalf of the plaintiff after any
contractually or statutorily required reductions, write-offs or write-downs. Haygood v. De Escabedo,
356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011).
258. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (2015). Most states have adopted "modified" comparative
fault, which reduces a personal injury plaintiff's damages by that person's percentage of fault, and does
not permit the person to recover if he or she is 50% or 51% at fault for the harm. See VI'7OR E.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATnVE NEGLIGENCE (5th ed. 2010). The few states that apply pure comparative
fault, such as California and Florida, are known for having excessive litigation.
259. In most states, punitive damages are not subject to comparative fault. A person who is
largely responsible for his or her own injury can sue an unpopular corporate defendant with the hope of
receiving a windfall award. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Two Wrongs Do Not Make
a Right: Reconsidering the Application of Comparative Fault to Punitive Damage Awards, 78 Mo. L.
REV. 133 (2013).
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risk that if a plaintiff is found mostly at fault for his or her own harm that
plaintiff may recover nothing.
In addition, Mississippi presently bars automobile accident defendants
from informing the jury that the occupants of the plaintiff's vehicle were
not wearing seatbelts.260  This year, a unanimous Texas Supreme Court
abandoned this practice, calling it "a vestige of a bygone legal system and
an oddity in light of modern societal norms" in which seatbelt use is man-
dated by law and has become "an unquestioned part of daily life for the
vast majority of drivers and passengers. "261 Mississippi should do the
same.
Furthermore, the Legislature could constrain punitive damages in a
manner more closely aligned with other states. Such a limit could require
proportionality between the harm caused by the defendant and the punish-
ment imposed.
The Legislature might also consider ways to further address the Missis-
sippi Attorney General's practice of hiring private contingent fee attorneys
to bring lawsuits on behalf of the state. The New York Times has reported
that "[i]n no place has the contingency fee practice flourished more than in
Mississippi, where lawyers hired by Attorney General Jim Hood have col-
lected $57.5 million in fees during the last two years-three times as much
as Mr. Hood has spent on running his state office during the same
period. "262
IV. CONCLUSION
Before civil justice reform in Mississippi, the state's perception as an
unfair legal jurisdiction hurt its competitiveness. Businesses and consum-
ers were harmed by the state's reputation for jackpot justice. Legislative
and judicial reforms made Mississippi's legal climate more fair and predict-
able. The state's legal, business, and healthcare climate have improved.263
Mississippi should continue to build on its strong foundation for legal
reform, ensuring that the state continues to be viewed as "open for busi-
ness." For example, the jury service system needs further improvements.
260. Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-2-3 (2015) (prohibiting introduction of seatbelt evidence for the jury's
consideration in evaluating comparative fault or deciding whether the plaintiff mitigated damages).
Mississippi courts have allowed introduction of such evidence in highly limited circumstances where not
deemed prejudicial to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 904 So. 2d 1077 (Miss.
2005) (admissible to show plaintiff did not follow warnings); Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So. 2d 797 (Miss.
2000) (use of seat belts admissible on the issue of injuries and their severity).
261. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romaro, No. 13-0136 (Tex. Feb. 13, 2015). The Texas Legislature
repealed a statutory rule prohibiting introduction of seatbelt evidence in 2003, effectively restoring the
common law prohibition and allowing the state's high court to change the law. See id. In Mississippi,
the Legislature must amend Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-2-3 (2015) to permit juries to consider the use of
seatbelts in allocating comparative fault for an injury.
262. Eric Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-by-coaxing-at-
torneys-general-to-sue-.html.
263. Reflecting on the state's progress in 2011, Governor Barbour viewed tort reform as "a major
factor in economic growth and job creation" in Mississippi. Hon. Haley Barbour, 2011 State of the
State Address (Jan. 11, 2011).
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Asbestos and silica lawsuits have been plagued by abuses that need to be
addressed. The increasing divergence between rates billed and amounts
paid for medical treatment has exacerbated the "phantom damage" prob-
lem. Other reforms are needed to address issues such as pure comparative
fault and the prohibition against admission of "seatbelt evidence" at trial.
It is also vital that the Mississippi Supreme Court uphold the constitution-
ality of the state's limits on noneconomic damages.
